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Continuing Payment on One's Debt to Society:
The German Model of Felon
Disenfranchisement as an Alternative
Nora V. Dernleitnert
Lyndon La Rouche, a perennial presidential candidate, in
1992 ran for the highest office in the country from his prison
cell in Minnesota; yet he was not allowed to vote in the presi-
dential election.' La Rouche is not alone in this dilemma. As of
December 31, 1998, 1.3 million men and women were incarcer-
ated in federal and state prisons, amounting to over 1.8 million
individuals in custody across the United States.2 Almost 50
million Americans have a criminal record.3 Based on these
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1. See The Law on Convicted Felons Running for Office, STAR TRIB., Apr.
6, 1994, at 9E; Bob Minzesheimer, First Primary: More Hopeful for Fewer
Votes, USA TODAY, Dec. 26, 1991, at 4A.
2. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisoners in 1998 (visited Feb. 7,
2000) <httpJ/www.ojp.usdg.gov/bjs/abstract.p98.htm>. Projections for 1999
and 2000 indicate that by the end of each year, the jail and prison population
will have increased by an additional 80,000 inmates, rising to over two million
by December 2000. See The Sentencing Project, National Inmate Population
of Two Million Projected in 2000 (visited Feb. 9, 2000) <http:l/wwv.sentencing
project.org/pubs/tsppubs/prison/htm>. According to the Justice Policy Insti-
tute, the two million mark was already reached the week of February 14,
2000. See Jesse Katz, U.S. Prison Population Reaches 2 Million Mark, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESs-NEWS, Feb. 19, 2000, at 16A.
3. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SURVEY OF CRIMINAL HISTORY
INFORMATION SYSTEMS 13 tbl.1 (1993).
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numbers, approximately 3.9 million people-about two percent
of the voting population-are currently disenfranchised either
because they are currently imprisoned or because of their fel-
ony records.4 In the future, denial of voting rights will impact
an even larger group of people as the number of individuals
under the supervision of the criminal justice system continues
to rise.
Denial of voting rights is only one of numerous collateral
sentencing consequences that await ex-offenders. Other effects
of criminal convictions include prohibitions on serving on a jury
or holding public office, 5 denial of occupational licenses, bans on
the possession of handguns, and registration and notification
requirements. 6 Although in the United States collateral sen-
tencing consequences were extensively debated in the late
1950s and the 1960s, they have not been discussed in recent
years.7 Policy-makers and citizens have taken it for granted
that offenders continue to be deprived of certain rights long af-
ter having completed their sentences. Only the 1998 report
Losing the Vote: The Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement Laws
issued jointly by Human Rights Watch and The Sentencing
4. See JAMIE FELLNER & MARC MAUER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & THE
SENTENCING PROJECT, LOSING THE VOTE: THE IMPACT OF FELONY
DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS 7 (1998).
5. During the impeachment of President Clinton, one of the penalties
demanded by the House prosecutors was a life-long ban on holding office. See,
e.g., Ian Brodie, Damning List of Abuses Drawn Up for Impeachment, THE
TIMES, Dec. 11, 1998, at 4M; Paul Leavitt, Presenting the Case: How Long,
Who Will Testify, USA TODAY, Jan. 11, 1999, at 8A. To many people, that re-
quest seemed unprecedented because it went much farther than the sanctions
ever contemplated against former President Nixon. See, e.g., Alan Hirsch,
Contorting the Constitution, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1999, at A17. However,
public discussion almost never acknowledges that many convicted offenders
remain under a lifetime ban to hold state public office.
6. In the name of retribution and incapacitation, state and federal gov-
ernments have recently passed further legislation that supplements this array
of collateral consequences. Among the most notable are offender registration
and notification statutes. For a more complete listing of collateral sentencing
consequences, see Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for
Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POLaY REV.
77 (1999).
7. An exception is the discussion surrounding the racial impact of the
denial of voting rights to ex-offenders. See generally FELLNER & MAUER, su-
pra note 4; Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship, Criminal-
ity, and "the Purity of the Ballot Box," 102 HARV. L. REV. 1300 (1989); Alice E.
Harvey, Comment, Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement and Its Influence on the
Black Vote: The Need for a Second Look, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1145 (1994); An-
drew L. Shapiro, Note, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the
Voting Rights Act: A New Strategy, 103 YALE L.J. 537 (1993).
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Project has triggered a partial reconsideration of felon disen-
franchisement in a number of states and in Congress.8
Even in a very punitive political climate, many collateral
consequences, and especially denial of voting rights, fit only
uncomfortably, if at all, into the existing sanctioning frame-
work and its justifications. The dominant justifications un-
derlying disenfranchisement are empirically unsound and have
become defunct. Most civilized countries have, therefore, lim-
ited or abolished voting restrictions imposed on ex-offenders.
Specifically, Germany and a number of states in the United
States have acknowledged the unfairness of exclusion from the
ballot box in a democratic society and have also recognized that
such unfairness creates the potential for inequality. For exam-
ple, in the United States racial minorities are substantially
overrepresented among those subject to disenfranchisement,
largely because of the unequal enforcement of criminal law and
the repercussions of the "War on Drugs."9 In fact, 1.4 million
black men, out of a total of 3.9 million ex-offenders, are barred
from voting.'0 The racial disparity has caused some state leg-
islatures in recent months to consider measures that would se-
verely limit or eliminate the disenfranchisement of ex-felons.II
Despite strong support by civil rights groups, these proposed
bills have run into severe opposition from some lawmakers.1 2
To counter the negative effects of large-scale disenfran-
chisement, this Article suggests the German approach as a
model for changes in American law. In comparing and con-
trasting the avenues chosen in the United States and Germany,
this Article illuminates the different attitudes societies have
taken toward ex-offenders. In most American states, denial of
the franchise applies automatically to a vast panoply of of-
fenses, including relatively minor crimes. Often disenfran-
chisement continues for many years after conviction and re-
lease or even for life. In Germany, however, deprivation of
voting rights is limited to serious, legislatively enumerated of-
8. See Patricia Allard & Marc Mauer, The Sentencing Project, Regaining
the Vote: An Assessment of Activity Relating to Felon Disenfranchisement Laws
(visited Feb. 9, 2000) <http'/www.sentencingproject.org/news/regainvote.
htm>.
9. See FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 4, at 8-11.
10. See id. at 7.
11. See Allard & Mauer, supra note 8.
12. See Michael A. Fletcher, Voting Rights for Felons Win Support, WASH.
POST, Feb. 22, 1999, at Al.
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fenses, must be assessed directly by the sentencing judge at the
time of sentencing, and can be imposed only for a limited and
relatively short period of time.
Ultimately, these differences indicate that denial of the
franchise in the United States aims at exiling ex-offenders
upon release from prison and disables them from actively par-
ticipating in the political arena. Because of these effects, denial
of the franchise must be viewed as a penalty. The historic ori-
gin of this sentencing consequence and its statutory placement
in some states support this claim. The official justification pro-
vided for denial of the franchise to ex-offenders, however, is
frequently the "purity of the ballot box." As a comparative
analysis will demonstrate, this argument can be read either as
prevention-based or as retributive. In either case, the German
provision permitting the deprivation of the franchise is prefer-
able to the current legal situation in many American states.
Even though the German approach has been controversial, it
provides a model that permits the temporary exclusion of only a
small number of offenders, and ultimately promises all of them
reintegration. The most beneficial effects of such a framework
in the United States would be that it should not only dramati-
cally decrease the number of ex-offenders who are disenfran-
chised but also remedy the currently existing racial imbalance.
The final part of this Article will consider paths to reform
in the United States and suggest lessons derived from guideline
sentencing. Judges will need to be provided with guidance as
to the types of fact scenarios that trigger denial of voting rights
and the length of time for which such a denial is to be effective.
This Article recommends that appellate courts develop a com-
mon law, analogous to the English guideline judgments, out-
lining the factors lower courts should consider in their decision-
making. Such rules should help prevent unwarranted disparity
in the imposition of voting bans on offenders.
I. THE GERMAN MODEL
A. DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF OFFENDERS UNDER GERMAN LAW
1. Historical Overview
Continental European countries have recognized collateral
sentencing consequences for centuries. Such collateral effects
have generally been styled as sanctions affecting personal
honor (Ehrenstrafen). Historically, they grew out of two differ-
[Vol. 84:753
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ent traditions. Under the Roman tradition, honor implied pos-
sessing all rights of a citizen, i.e., the panoply of political rights
available. The loss of honor, therefore, connoted the loss of
one's position ,s a citizen.' 3 Largely irrelevant to this under-
standing of honor were considerations of equal treatment and
human rights that attach to an individual by virtue of his hu-
manity rather than his citizenship. The Teutons, however, de-
veloped a right of personhood that allowed for individual liberty
and honor independent of the state but tied to the individual's
standing in society. In their understanding a dishonorable
crime deprived the offender of honor.' 4 It is assumed that the
German Ehrenstrafen grew out of this conceptualization of in-
dividual honor. 15
Early doubts about Ehrenstrafen arose during the Enlight-
enment. 16 The French mort civile, which declared an offender
legally dead and thus deprived him of all civil, political and
economic rights, was harshly criticized during the nineteenth
century. It was challenged as impractical and unjust because it
did not accord with any penological goals. Its critics noted that
it was unnecessary and ineffective for the attainment of gen-
eral preventive aims and could not be reconciled with individ-
ual deterrence, especially when the latter was viewed as inter-
twined with rehabilitation. The unjust character of the mort
civile arose in part also from its application to a wide variety of
disparate offenses. 17
Nevertheless, Germany, like the United States, allowed for
restrictions on a vast array of an offender's civil rights until the
late 1960s. Since the founding of the German Empire, those ef-
fects were considered Nebenstrafen (collateral penalties). They
were based on the assumption that an offender lost his honor
and concomitant rights not through the sentence imposed but
rather through his dishonorable conduct.' 8 Frequently such
deprivations were a direct consequence of a conviction to Zucht-
13. See OLIVER SCHWARZ, DIE STRAFGERICHTLICHE ABERKENNUNG DER
AMTSFA-IGKEIT UND DES WAHLREcHTs 20 (1991).
14. See EMIL KOHNE, DIE EHRENSTRAFEN 11-12 (1931).
15. See SCHWARZ, supra note 13, at 22, 26.
16. See id. at 23-24.
17. See FRANZ WEITHASE, OBER DEN BURGERLICHEN TOD ALS
STRAFFOLGE 91-93 (1966).
18. See KOHNE, supra note 14, at 16.
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haus, an aggravated form of prison, which entailed the auto-
matic loss of civil rights.19
Nebenstrafen were based on retributive and denunciatory
concepts. They were designed to allow the state to condemn
dishonorable conduct as well as the dishonored offender. 20
While the deed itself was viewed as determinative of the of-
fender's loss of honor, the offender's moral blameworthiness
also played a role. Therefore, the imposition of three months
imprisonment (Gefdngnis) was the prerequisite for a loss of
civil rights.2'
As early as 1931, legislators proposed a change that would
have prohibited a permanent loss of rights. The length of the
loss would have depended on whether the offender could be as-
sumed to abuse his rights. The temporary nature of the pro-
posed loss signaled the proponents' belief in the possibility of
the offender's rehabilitation.22 Had this proposal been adopted,
it would have dramatically changed the justification for collat-
eral penalties in Germany. The nefarious deed itself would no
longer automatically disqualify the offender from exercising his
rights. No longer would retributive goals dominate. Instead,
safety and prevention would play a substantial role in the im-
position of collateral penalties. 23
After World War II, loss of voting rights became a discre-
tionary judicial decision, even when Zuchthaus was imposed.
The only exception was conviction for perjury, which entailed
an automatic loss of voting rights.24 Voting rights could be de-
nied only temporarily: the loss was restricted to a period of two
to ten years for Zuchthaus penalties and one to five years for
prison sentences. 25
2. Current Law
By the mid-1960s the usefulness of such additional sen-
tencing consequences was increasingly questioned in Germany,
other European countries, and the United States. At the end of
19. See CLAUS ROxIN, I STRAFRECHT: ALLGEMEINER TEIL 87 (3d ed. 1997).
20. See KOHNE, supra note 14, at 23.
21. See id. No such prerequisite existed for Zuchthaus penalties because
any Zuchthaus sentence connoted moral blameworthiness.
22. Cf ALBERT ESSER, DIE EHRENSTRAFE 7, 89 (1956) (describing how
"civil death" in France assumed the impossibility of rehabilitation).
23. See KOHNE, supra note 14, at 28.
24. See SCHWARZ, supra note 13, at 35.
25. See id. at 36.
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that decade, the German Parliament was ready to entertain a
major overhaul of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) that also
impacted collateral sentencing consequences. Based on a
multi-year in-depth study by two different groups of legal aca-
demics and a subsequent separate analysis presented by a spe-
cial committee of the German legislature, the German Parlia-
ment passed the first and second reform laws to the Criminal
Code in 1969. The first reform law eliminated the distinction
between prison and Zuchthaus.26 Legislators justified this de-
cision with a finding that the harsher life in the Zuchthaus and
the additional, automatically-imposed collateral consequences
hindered the reintegration of the ex-offender into society with-
out presenting any countervailing advantages. 27
Despite this reform, denial of the franchise remains as an
optional collateral sentencing consequence in the German
Criminal Code.28 Although one of the two academic study
groups proposed eliminating those sanctions in their entirety,
the legislature opted against this because it would have en-
tailed modifying about 150 federal and state laws-a feat con-
sidered impossible at the end of the legislative session that
year.29 Even though the legislature had planned on taking up
this issue in the following year, it has not done so to this day,
and no apparent political or public pressure exists to revisit
this topic.30 The overall lack of interest in the provision may be
connected to the fact that the number of cases adjudicated an-
nually that deprive the offender of voting rights is minuscule.31
Moreover, the legislative set-up seems to find favor in the eyes
of international law scholars.32
The decrease in the number of pardon applications indi-
cates the dramatic change the revision of the Criminal Code
26. See ROXIN, supra note 19, at 83, 87.
27. See id. at 87.
28. See § 45(5) Strafgesetzbuch [StGB].
29. See Ursula Nelles, Statusfolgen als "Nebenfolgen" einer Straftat (Art.
45 StGB), 111991 JURISTENZEITUNG 17, 21 (1991).
30. Academic criticism of the provision, however, exists. See generally
SCHWARZ, supra note 13; Jirgen Jekewitz, Der Ausschluss vom aktiven und
passiven Wahlrecht zum Deutschen Bundestag und zu den Volksvertretungen
der Ldnder auf Grund richterlicher Entscheidung, 1977 GOLTDAMMER's
ARCHIV FOR STRAFRECHT 161 (1977); Nelles, supra note 29.
31. In 1987, for example, the provision was used only 11 times. See
SCHWARZ, supra note 13, at 19.
32. See, e.g., Karl Josef Partsch, Freedom of Conscience and Expression,
and Political Freedoms, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 209, 243 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981).
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has brought to Germany. Until 1969, a relatively large number
of pardon applications were filed annually because courts were
unable to remove the permanent collateral consequences that
accompanied a conviction and sentence of Zuchthaus.33 Re-
quests for pardons decreased substantially in subsequent years,
largely due to the severe limits placed on collateral sentencing
consequences in the two sentencing reform laws of 1969. 34
Collateral consequences of a criminal conviction as they
pertain to active and passive voting rights are covered in sec-
tion 45 of the German Criminal Code.35 Any offender, sen-
tenced to more than one year of imprisonment, 36 will automati-
cally lose his passive voting rights for a period of five years.37
The court also has the opportunity to deny passive voting rights
to any offender sentenced to a shorter period of imprisonment
or to probation.38 This is only possible, however, if the specific
law under which the offender is being sentenced explicitly per-
mits the court to impose the additional offense consequence.39
In contrast to the denial of passive voting rights, the depri-
vation of the right to vote never automatically follows a convic-
tion.40 If the law under which the offender is convicted permits
it, the court has the option of depriving the offender of his right
to vote for a period of two to five years.41 The time period be-
gins to run only after the offender finishes serving the prison
sentence imposed, even though it becomes legally effective upon
33. See HANs-GEORG SCHATZLER, HANDBUCH DES GNADENRECHTS 24, 68-
69 (2d ed. 1992).
34. See id. at 24.
35. Active voting rights imply the right to vote, passive voting rights the
right to be elected. The latter are only covered here to provide a comprehen-
sive picture of section 45 StGB.
36. Under the German Criminal Code, a crime (Verbrechen) is defined as
a legally sanctionable act that carries a prison sentence of one year or more.
Any legally sanctionable offense that carries a lesser penalty is a Vergehen.
See § 12 StGB; see also JOHANNES WESSELS, STRAFRECHT ALLGEMEINER TEIL
4 (27th ed. 1997).
37. See § 45(1) StGB. For a critique of this provision as incompatible with
the more differentiated disenfranchisement provision under section 45(5), see
Jekewitz, supra note 30, at 169.
38. See § 45(2) StGB.
39. See id.
40. The right to vote is construed broadly and not limited only to local,
state and national elections. Rather, it also encompasses other public elec-
tions. See SCHWARZ, supra note 13, at 60.
41. See § 45(5) StGB. While not mandatory, disenfranchisement should
be imposed for full years. See HERBERT TRONDLE & THOMAS FIScHER,
STRAFGESETZBUCH UND NEBENGESETZE 289 (49th ed. 1999).
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conviction. 42 The offenses which allow the court to deny an of-
fender the right to vote are assumed to be those whose commis-
sion will or is likely to undermine the foundation of the state43
or constitutes tampering with elections. Such offenses include:
preparation of a war of aggression, treason, use of insignia of a
prohibited political organization, sabotage, espionage, election
fraud, bribery of voters, and similar crimes.4 Attempt, com-
plicity and attempted complicity in such offenses are also cov-
ered.45 Even if convicted of one of these offenses, the offender
must be sentenced to a period of at least six months of impris-
onment before the court may consider depriving him of the
franchise.46
A pardon can restore active voting rights as long as it cov-
ers that sanction explicitly.47 However, a judicial remedy also
exists. The sentencing court may reinstate the offender's vot-
ing rights when at least half the time for which the deprivation
of the franchise was assessed has passed, and the court does
not expect the offender to commit other intentional crimes. 48 In
deciding on a reinstatement request, the court is to consider
whether the restoration of voting rights will assist in rehabili-
tating the offender in light of the crime committed and the of-
fender's background, whether the offender will use the rights,
and whether she can be trusted with the execution of such
functions.49 Therefore, the judicial assessment encompasses
safety and rehabilitative concerns.
42. See § 45a StGB. For a critique of this provision, see Jekewitz, supra
note 30, at 166. In this respect the denial of the franchise differs from the
deprivation of a driver's license which becomes effective on the day of sen-
tencing, with the time of imprisonment counting fully toward the period dur-
ing which the offender is banned from driving.
43. See TRONDLE & FISCHER, supra note 41, at 289.
44. The denial of the right to vote as a Nebenstrafe is mentioned in sec-
tions 92a (covering §§ 80-90b StGB), 101 (covering §§ 93-100a StGB), 102(11)
(covering § 102 StGB), 109i (covering §§ 109e-109f StGB), and 108c StGB.
Membership in a terroristic organization is not a ground for denial of voting
rights. See SCHWARZ, supra note 13, at 50-54.
45. See KARL LACKNER & KRISTIAN KOHL, STRAFGESETZBUCH 283 (22nd
ed. 1997).
46. TRONDLE & FISCHER, supra note 41, at 289.
47. See ADOLF SCHONKE & HORST SCHRODER, STRAFGESETZBUCH-
KOMMENTAR (Theodor Lenckner et al. eds., 25th ed. 1997).
48. See § 45b StGB (noting the potential future commission of intentional
offenses as a factor in reinstating the offender's voting rights); see also
SCHONKE & SCHRODER, supra note 47, at 634. This provision, which was pri-
marily grounded in rehabilitation ideals, was legally unprecedented.
49. See TRONDLE & FISCHER, supra note 41, at 291. If the denial of voting
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Another indication of the concern that denial of voting
rights can obstruct rehabilitation is that section 45 cannot be
applied to youths (i.e., those under eighteen).50 Moreover, those
between eighteen and twenty-one are generally not subjected to
that provision even though they are not explicitly excluded
from its coverage. 51
B. A CRITIQUE OF SECTION 45 STGB: SYSTEMIC CHARGES
Critics have declared that section 45 violates the German
Constitution.52 They argue that any denial of voting rights fol-
lowing a criminal conviction contradicts a fundamental value of
the German Constitution: universal and equal suffrage.53 The
German Constitutional Court has not yet directly addressed
this question.54
Critics also argue that the provision fails to fit tightly into
the catalog of sanctions. Legal academics have developed the
German Criminal Code and its modifications with internal logi-
cal coherence and completeness. Section 45 fits only uneasily
into this analytical system. First, the German Criminal Code
distinguishes between penalties and Massregeln, protective
measures.55 Textually, the deprivation of voting rights is
grouped with penalties and is considered a collateral rather
than a primary penalty.56 To de-emphasize the penal character
rights is considered a criminal sanction, the severity of the offense and consid-
erations of general prevention may be decisive. See SCHONKE & SCHRODER,
supra note 47, at 634-35.
50. See SCHONKE & SCHRODER, supra note 47, at 632; TRONDLE &
FISCHER, supra note 41, at 290.
51. See SCHWARZ, supra note 13, at 40.
52. See, e.g., Hans Meyer, Wahlgrundsitze und Wahlverfahren, in 2
HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 269, 270
(Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhofeds., 1987).
53. See SCHWARZ, supra note 13, at 95; Meyer, supra note 52, at 270.
54. See SCHWARZ, supra note 13, at 93. The constitutional arguments
made in Germany parallel the U.S. challenges to the denial of the franchise
under the Equal Protection Clause and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. See in-
fra notes 107-13, 130 and accompanying text. The German Constitutional
Court implicitly upheld section 45. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
55. See TRONDLE & FIsCHER, supra note 41, at 249.
56. See id. at 250; see also Nelles, supra note 29, at 21 (arguing that the
deprivation of voting rights cannot be considered a Massregel-a measure de-
signed to protect public safety-because it is textually grouped with penalties
rather than security-based restrictions on an individual's freedom and fails to
accomplish any significant preventive purpose).
[Vol. 84:753
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of disenfranchisement, however, the provision is entitled "col-
lateral consequences." 57
Second, under German law, penalties are generally as-
sessed based on the hierarchy of penological goals outlined in
section 46, which focuses initially on the guilt of the offender
and the proportionality between the penalty and the offender's
guilt. The German sanctioning system also considers general
deterrence58 and ultimately specific deterrence of the offender
through rehabilitation.5 9 Excluding an offender from the right
to vote, however, does not seem conducive to attaining either of
these two goals. Because of these tensions and internal contra-
dictions, some have claimed that section 45(5) serves solely
preventive purposes, making proportionality considerations ir-
relevant.60
Section 45's harshest critics have used the absence of a
clear-cut justification as an argument against the retention of
this collateral consequence. They have contended that Neben-
strafen are unjustified because they severely stigmatize the ex-
offender without providing a strong countervailing purpose.
Those supporting section 45, however, view the suggested abo-
lition of these collateral consequences as an attack on the ethi-
cal and moral foundations of the criminal law. They assert that
without such consequences, a rise in crime could be expected.61
For them, the temporary disenfranchisement of select offenders
aims at protecting the social good by keeping the criminals
from exercising political power. In that respect, section 45 con-
tributes to the Reinhaltung des 6ffentlichen Lebens, the "purity
of public life."62
57. LACKNER & KOHL, supra note 45, at 282.
58. Section 46 does not explicitly list this goal. Instead it has been read
into other sections of the Criminal Code. See, e.g., FRANZ STRENG,
STRAFZUMESSUNG UND RELATIVE GERECHTIGKEIT 162-64 (1984).
59. See TRONDLE & FISCHER, supra note 41, at 293-94. The German leg-
islature intentionally avoided providing a clear hierarchy of penological goals
in section 46. See, e.g., DANIEL J. FISCHER, DIE NORMIERUNG DER
STRAFZWECKE NACH VORBILD DER U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES-EINE
CHANCE FOR DAS DEUTSCHE (STEUER-)STRAFRECHT? 33-34 (1999). Frequently
resocialization is viewed as the highest goal. See id. at 59. However, the
German courts have adhered to the so-called Vereinigungstheorie (combination
theory) which attempts to balance all penological goals. See, e.g., BVerfGE 45,
187 (239); BVerfGE [NStZ] (1994), 558. The recent decline of resocialization
as a sentencing goal has increased uncertainty. See FISCHER, supra, at 63-64.
60. See SCHWARZ, supra note 13, at 47-48.
61. See id. (recounting arguments on both sides).
62. Nelles, supra note 29, at 21.
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Even if a collateral sanction could be justified, critics argue
that its imposition in individual cases is not well-regulated.
Generally, the Penal Code admonishes the sentencing court to
prevent unnecessary harshness in sentencing by avoiding cer-
tain sanctions or at least restricting their lengths. Such a sen-
tencing guideline is imprecise, however. The only other guid-
ance given to the court is that it is to consider whether political
rights can be granted to an offender who violated the public
trust.63 Neither the German Criminal Code nor the federal
election law provides a more concrete standard by which a
court could develop a disciplined and coherent rationale for the
deprivation of the franchise and its length. Nevertheless, the
court must justify its decision at sentencing and provide a ra-
tionale for the imposition of this collateral consequence.
Despite these concerns about the constitutionality and the
abstract justifiability of section 45, and its equitable and just
imposition in individual cases, the German Constitutional
Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) has accepted the constitu-
tionality of this provision because it constitutes a historically
developed, and therefore traditionally acceptable, exclusion
from public life.64 Critics of the German decision have charged
that the Court deemed the right to vote a right of honor (biir-
gerliches Ehrenrecht) granted a citizen rather than a basic po-
litical right.65 They argue that the Constitutional Court's in-
terpretation of section 45 is irrational because changes in the
German criminal law enacted in the late 1960s abolished the
concept of Ehrenrechte.66
Despite these misgivings and shortcomings, section 45 may
be viewed as a compromise between certain safety require-
ments of a state, the public's demand for a condemnatory sanc-
tion, and the reintegrative needs of defendants. By granting
the judiciary the ability to single out and exclude from the bal-
lot box a select and narrowly circumscribed group of offenders,
the state retains its capacity to protect the democratic process.
On the one hand, offenders who are being deprived of vot-
ing rights satisfy retributive demands. These criminals are
also particularly stigmatized because of the unique and public
character of the sanction.67 On the other hand, the limited ap-
63. See TRONDLE & FISCHER, supra note 41, at 290.
64. See BVerfGE 36, 139 (142); see also SCHWARZ, supra note 13, at 92.
65. See Nelles, supra note 29, at 23-24.
66. See id.
67. For an account of a few spectacular cases in which the accused were
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plicability of the sanction complies with demands for rehabili-
tation and reintegration voiced in human rights conventions
and the German Constitution. 68 Ultimately, the highly differ-
entiated and relatively short-term deprivation of voting rights
with the possibility of early restoration of such rights is de-
signed to assist offenders in resocialization.
II. EX-OFFENDER DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES
While starting from a shared vision in the 1960s, the
United States has taken a different route than Germany in its
approach to denial of voting rights as a collateral sentencing
consequence. In the United States, restrictions on voting rights
are governed by state rather than federal law, subject only to
federal constitutional mandates.69 Therefore, state law deter-
mines whether an offender will retain or regain the franchise
after conviction, regardless of whether the conviction occurred
in state or federal court. Because state law governs voter eligi-
bility for congressional and presidential elections, a person
barred from voting in local and state elections is also prohibited
from casting a ballot in national elections. Potential constitu-
tional problems are associated with the passage of a federal law
revoking the exclusion of ex-offenders from voting in national
elections.70 Therefore, state legislatures are the more promis-
ing target for attempts to narrow disenfranchisement provi-
sions.
A. THE HISTORY OF FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT
Historically, denial of the franchise and removal from pub-
lic office were part of the English common law concept of at-
tainder, which mandated forfeiture for treason or commission
disenfranchised, see SCHWARZ, supra note 13, at 19.
68. The German Constitutional Court has officially recognized rehabilita-
tion and reintegration of an offender as sentencing goals because the welfare
state mandates that the state and the community care for the offender. See
BVerfGE 35, 202 (235-36) (the so-called Lebach-Judgment), quoted in ROXIN,
supra note 19, at 46.
69. See U.S. CONST. arts. I, II; amends. XIV, XVII, XIX, XXIV, XXVI.
70. See Andrew Shapiro, The Disenfranchised, AM. PROSPECT, Nov.-Dec.
1997, at 60; see also Right of Ex-Prisoners To Vote in Federal Elections: Hear-
ings on H.R. 906 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (testimony of Viet D. Dinh, Assistant Pro-
fessor of Law and Deputy Director of Asian Law and Policy Studies Program,
Georgetown University Law Center).
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of a felony, corruption of blood,7' and loss of civil rights.72 The
law treated felony offenders as if they had died, depriving them
of their property and their civil and political rights, dissolving
their marriages, and prohibiting them from concluding any
contracts or bringing suit.7 3 Such penalties had retributive and
deterrent goals.74
After gaining independence, the United States rejected
some of this common law heritage. It adhered to a lesser form
of "civil death" than England did in the late eighteenth century.
The Constitution, for example, abolished forfeiture for treason
and corruption of blood.7 5 In the second half of the twentieth
century, many of the surviving consequences of "civil death"
statutes, such as the inability to enter into contracts or to in-
herit property, were abolished in American states.76
During the late 1950s the denial of voting rights came un-
der heavy attack from a broad alliance of groups. These in-
cluded among others the National Conference on Uniform State
Laws, the American Law Institute, the National Probation and
Parole Association, the National Advisory Commission on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, and the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of
Justice.7 7 Their goal was to limit all collateral consequences of
convictions on ex-offenders. Together with a substantial num-
ber of members of Congress, these groups viewed such depriva-
tions as contrary to the then-dominant penological goals of re-
habilitation and offender reintegration. In their eyes,
disenfranchisement excluded offenders from society and thus
increased the likelihood of recidivism.
71. Under English law, attainted persons could not retain, inherit, or pass
an estate to their heirs. See BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY 311 (5th ed. 1979) (de-
fining "corruption of blood").
72. See Howard Itzkowitz & Lauren Oldak, Restoring the Ex-Offender's
Right to Vote: Background and Developments, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 721, 724
(1973). These concepts survived in England until the late nineteenth century.
See J.M. KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY 344 (1992).
73. See 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES: RIGHTS OF THE PERSON 800 (1968).
74. See Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note 72, at 726.
75. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
76. See Demleitner, supra note 6, at 79.
77. These groups filed amicus briefs in Richardson v. Ramirez supporting
full suffrage rights for ex-offenders. 418 U.S. 24, 84-85 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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The movement to limit collateral sentencing consequences
was not merely national in scope. Rather, it was part of an in-
ternational reformation of criminal laws motivated by beliefs in
the rehabilitation and resocialization of offenders after they
had served their sentences. The German and American aca-
demic, political and legal argumentation on these issues paral-
leled each other during those years.7 8 The dominant consensus
in the United States, however, collapsed during the 1970s when
retribution, incapacitation and deterrence began to replace re-
habilitation as sentencing goals.
Although the domestic reform movement did not succeed in
the passage of national legislation granting ex-offenders voting
rights, a number of states modified their exclusionary legisla-
tion. Many states now allow for reinstatement of voting rights
either automatically upon release or upon request relatively
quickly after the end of a sentence.7 9 Without those legislative
changes, the number of individuals barred from voting would
constitute an even larger percentage of eligible voters. How-
ever, denial of the right to vote lives on in many states follow-
ing automatically upon a criminal conviction and precluding
millions of potential voters from exercising the franchise.
B. FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT TODAY
In the vast majority of states any sentence of imprison-
ment implies a loss of the franchise at least during the time of
incarceration. 80 In comparison, the voting rights of released of-
78. See, e.g., Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, Die kriminalpolitische Konzeption
des Alternativ-Entwurfs eines Strafgesetzbuchs (Algemeiner Tel), 80
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT (ZSTW) 54, 54-55
(1968).
79. See Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note 72, at 755-57. Even though a num-
ber of states, such as California and New York, gained favorable court deci-
sions upholding their broad disenfranchisement statutes, their respective leg-
islatures subsequently narrowed the provisions dramatically.
80. The statutory information provided in this Article is derived primarily
from OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATORNEY, U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, CIVIL
DISABILITIES OF CONVICTED FELONS: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (1996) and
Allard & Mauer, supra note 8.
Currently, only Maine, Massachusetts and Vermont do not exclude prison
inmates from voting. In New Hampshire, a trial court has struck down the
disenfranchisement of inmates under state constitutional provisions. How-
ever, the state supreme court has not yet rendered a final decision on the is-
sue. See id. Utah, on the other hand, recently moved to disenfranchise its
inmates. See id. In response to inmates' attempts to form a political action
committee, Massachusetts is currently considering a constitutional amend-
ment to bring about the same result. See id.
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fenders and those not sentenced to prison vary between the in-
dividual states. Fourteen states ban ex-offenders convicted of a
vast array of offenses automatically from voting upon convic-
tion, independent of the length of the prison sentence im-
posed.8' Some impose such a ban even if the offender was sen-
tenced to probation. 82 The disenfranchisement provisions are
frequently constitutionally based and implemented through
non-penal statutes rather than the criminal law. Because
these laws operate automatically, a judge is unable to prevent
their imposition at sentencing.8 3 Moreover, the automatic
character of the sanction precludes the sentencing judge from
considering disenfranchisement as part of the sentence. Rather
Although this Article focuses on those released from confinement but bur-
dened by the denial of political rights, many of the arguments put forth can
also be extended to incarcerated offenders. Correction officials have tradition-
ally justified inmate disenfranchisement with practical concerns, such as the
arrangement of voting booths in prisons and the potential impact of the in-
mate vote in local elections, especially in rural areas. Any pragmatic justifica-
tions for denying those incarcerated the right to vote, however, should be sub-
ject to serious scrutiny since Germany, like many other countries, allows,
enables, and even encourages prisoners to vote. The same, of course, holds
true for the three U.S. states which currently grant the franchise to prison
inmates.
Even South Africa has recently joined the group of countries (and U.S.
states) which allow inmates the right to participate in the democratic process.
In a decision rendered in the spring of 1999, the South African Constitutional
Court rejected the denial of voting rights to prison inmates absent passage of a
generally applicable statute. See August v. Electoral Comm'n, 1999 (8) SALR
1 (CC). The interim South African Constitution had explicitly permitted the
disqualification of those imprisoned for specified serious offences, which were
statutorily defined as "'(i) [miurder, robbery with aggravating circumstances
and rape; or (ii) any attempt to commit [such an] offence." Id. at 2. The cur-
rent Constitution no longer provides for such disqualifications, and neither
does the Electoral Act. See id. at 3-4. The Constitutional Court, therefore,
held that all prison inmates must be permitted to cast their ballot in elections
unless Parliament enacts a generally applicable statute to the contrary.
81. See OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, supra note 80, app. A.
82. See id. at 126.
83. In this respect any automatic collateral consequence can be likened to
a mandatory minimum penalty which requires the judge to impose a (mini-
mum) sentence once an offender is found guilty of the requisite statutory vio-
lation. With prosecutorial assistance, however, judges may be able to avoid
mandatory minimum sentences if they consider them unjust in the individual
case. For an empirical discussion of substantial assistance motions which al-
low federal judges to sentence an offender below the mandatory minimum, see
generally Linda Drazga Maxfield & John H. Kramer, Substantial Assistance:
An Empirical Yardstick Gauging Equity in Current Federal Policy and Prac-
tice, 11 FED. SENTENCING REP. 6 (1998).
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it is deemed an unrelated administrative consequence, akin to
the loss of a driver's license or an occupational license.
84
Many states reinstate voting rights either automatically
upon release or relatively quickly after the end of a sentence.
85
New York, for example, restricts an ex-offender's voting rights
only as long as he or she is on parole or imprisoned upon expi-
ration of his or her maximum sentence.
86
In contrast to the automatic restoration of voting rights,
some states permit ex-offenders to petition to have their names
entered on the roll. Such restoration of rights may occur either
through a judicial or an administrative proceeding or through
executive clemency. California, for example, grants offenders
the opportunity to have their convictions set aside upon suc-
cessful completion of probation.87 Other states have similar
procedures that allow a court to restore an ex-offender's civil
rights upon petition.88
Alternatively, voting rights may be restored through an
executive pardon.8 9 Pardons, however, are generally awarded
infrequently and only for relatively minor offenses committed
many years in the past.90 In Virginia, for example, which has
84. See generally Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 110 (1996) (finding
that collateral employment consequences did not merit downward departure
under the federal sentencing guidelines because they were already considered
by the guideline provision under which the offenders were sentenced).
85. See Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note 72, at 755-57.
86. See GLENN EDWARD MURRAY, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF
CRIMINAL CONDUCT 15 (1992).
87. See OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, supra note 80, at 31.
88. See, e.g., id. at 129-30 (restoring an offender's civil rights upon ex-
pungement of his record by the court of conviction in Utah); id. at 136 (restor-
ing an offender's civil rights upon final discharge issued by the sentencing
court in Washington).
89. See MURRAY, supra note 86, at 15 (using New York as an example of a
state where voting rights may be restored by executive pardon).
90. See, e.g., Ed Anderson, Foster Won't Hurry Pardons, TIMES-PICAYUNE,
Dec. 28, 1998, at B1; Few Have Received Pardons from Bush, SAN ANTONIO
ExPRESS-NEWS, Jan. 23, 2000, at 15A; Michael Rezendes, Granting Pardons
No Priority for Celluci in Break with Custom, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 26, 1999,
at Al. Although some disagreement exists over the issue, presidential par-
dons of federal offenders have been held to restore the right to vote in state
elections. See, e.g., Cowan v. Prowse, 19 S.W. 407, 411 (Ky. Ct. App. 1892);
Jones v. Board of Registrars, 56 Miss. 766, 769 (1879); Randall H. Bryant, II,
Effect of Presidential Pardon-State Civil Rights Restored-§ 2255 Petition
Rendered Moot-Bjerkan v. United States, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 335, 339
(1976); Comment, Presidential Clemency and the Restoration of Civil Rights:
Appraising the Consequences of a Full Article II Pardon, 61 IOWA L. REV.
1427, 1428 (1976). For arguments to the contrary, see United States v.
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over 200,000 disenfranchised ex-offenders, the governor par-
doned 404 of them in 1996 and 1997.91 Therefore, pardons are
not generally an effective means of restoring voting rights.
Moreover, in a number of states the governors lack the power to
pardon federal offenders.92 This requires those felons to receive
a presidential pardon prior to restoration of their civil and po-
litical rights unless a state judicial or administrative process is
available to them.93 For these reasons pardons have a numeri-
cally negligible effect on the restoration of voting rights. In ad-
dition, not all ex-offenders are aware of the possibility of peti-
tioning for a pardon, and many may shy away from the
protracted process. Finally, pardons are part of the political
process from which the well-connected may benefit dispropor-
tionately.94
C. JUSTIFYING DISENFRANCHISEMENT
Even though denial of the franchise constitutes a substan-
tial restriction on political rights in a democratic polity, justifi-
cations for disenfranchisement have been rare. 95 Most justifi-
cations have been tied to the dominant sentencing philosophy.
When rehabilitation was deemed the goal of sentencing, many
states abolished their disenfranchisement provisions because
Noonan, 906 F.2d 952, 960 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that a presidential pardon
does not entitle the recipient to expunction of all court records relating to his
conviction); KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS 83 (1989) ("[A] presidential
pardon does not, in itself, restore any of the civil or professional rights lost as
a result of a criminal conviction."); Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy
Strained: Wrestling the Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEx. L. REV. 569,
633 n.367 (1991).
For a discussion of the decline in presidential pardons, see MOORE, supra,
at 82-83; Kobil, supra, at 602-04; John Elvin, Pardon Me, America, INSIGHT ON
NEWS (News World Communications, Inc.), Oct. 26, 1998, at 14.
91. See Human Rights Watch, Felon Laws Bar 3.9 Million Americans
from Voting (visited Jan. 16, 2000) <http://www.hrw.org/hrw/press98/oct/
vote1022.htm>. For figures from other states, see Human Rights Watch, Fact
Sheet: States That Bar Ex-Offenders from Voting (visited Jan. 16, 2000)
<http://www.hrw.orgthrw/press98oct/vote_fact 1022.htm>.
92. See OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, supra note 80, app. A.
93. See id. at 2-3.
94. See Kobil, supra note 90, at 610 (noting that at the state level, "the
most important factor in successful clemency applications appears to be the
widespread support of influential individuals in the community" rather than
considerations ofjustice and fairness).
95. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 7, at 560 (discussing attempts by states
to justify disenfranchisement in the name of state interest); see also Dillen-
burg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1224 (9th Cir. 1972) (recognizing the difficulty
in defining a justifiable state interest for disenfranchisement).
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they were viewed as impeding rehabilitation.9 6 With the rise in
retributive, incapacitative and deterrent goals, different types
of collateral sentencing consequences again have become an in-
tegral part of sanctioning offenders even though frequently
empirical support for their existence and retention is missing.
States tend to defend disenfranchisement by arguing that it
preserves the "purity of the ballot box." 97
1. 'Purity of the Ballot Box"
Independent of their offense of conviction, ex-offenders are
assumed either to vote in an anti-democratic and anti-rule of
law manner or to engage in election fraud.98 These assump-
tions about all ex-offenders allow states to deny them voting
rights automatically rather than upon case-specific judicial or
administrative findings, as in Germany. However, the precepts
underlying disenfranchisement do not hold up to scrutiny.
The claim that ex-offenders vote in an anti-democratic
manner is largely based on the fear that they would elect pro-
offender judges and district attorneys.99 Although this assump-
96. Even though ex-offenders are still kept from the voting booth in many
states, they are more likely to be on the roll than they were in 1950. Rehabili-
tation, the premier sentencing goal during the 1960s, mandated the abolition
of collateral consequences that inhibited the societal reintegration of ex-
offenders. With the demise of rehabilitation as a goal of punishment, the
pressure to abandon collateral sentencing consequences also evaporated. See
supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
97. Another argument occasionally put forth to support disenfranchise-
ment is based on Lockean social contract theory. The argument assumes that
people who break the law authorize society to remove them from further par-
ticipation in the political process. See Harvey, supra note 7, at 1169-70. How-
ever, that claim fails to rationalize and legitimate the cause and extent of such
exclusion. See id. at 1170.
98. See, e.g., Note, supra note 7, at 1302-03; Shapiro, supra note 7, at 561.
99. See, e.g., Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451-52 (2d Cir.
1967). Without justification, Judge Friendly noted in his panel opinion that:
[I]t can scarcely be deemed unreasonable for a state to decide that
perpetrators of serious crimes shall not take part in electing the leg-
islators who make the laws, the executives, who enforce these, the
prosecutors who must try them for further violations, or the judges
who are to consider their cases. This is especially so when account is
taken of the heavy incidence of recidivism and the prevalence of or-
ganized crime. A contention that the equal protection clause requires
New York to allow convicted mafiosi to vote for district attorneys or
judges would not only be without merit but as obviously so as any-
thing can be.
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
In addition to the tangible concern about corruption of the electoral proc-
ess, Professor Fletcher also points to a mystical aspect of the argument-the
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tion discriminates against offenders based on political convic-
tions ascribed to them, courts have upheld such content-based
discrimination even though the Voting Rights Act of 1965 pro-
hibits the exclusion of voters because of their likely voting pat-
tern.1°° The idea that all ex-offenders will vote as a coherent
group, driven by an identical anti-rule of law agenda, plays on
the public's fear that ex-offenders will cast their ballots as a
bloc, united solely by their background as offenders. This no-
tion is based on the larger concept, which dominates modern
penology, that individuals can be classified into groups based
on the risk they presumably pose to society. 1 1 Based on that
assessment, certain security measures can be applied to all
members of a group that is deemed high-risk. This argument,
if continued to its logical conclusion, provides the basis for re-
stricting the speech rights of ex-offenders, because they could
counsel voters. 102
Such restrictions on argumentation and voting, however,
are antithetical to a democratic state. A hallmark of democracy
is that the state is constantly re-inventing itself through the
input of voters.103 Excluding ex-offenders from the franchise
deprives a vast segment of the population, which has had an
experience that sets them apart, of the right and the opportu-
nity to influence the existing system, should they wish to do so,
in the primary way democratic societies recognize-through the
ballot-box.' °4 It also makes it impossible for ex-offenders to
display their democratic credentials.
idea that "tainted people will corrupt the electoral process; felons are tainted
and therefore will spread their taint to the electoral process." George P.
Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment: Reflections on the Racial Uses of
Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895, 1899 (1999).
100. See, e.g., Note, The Equal Protection Clause as a Limitation on the
States'Power To Disfranchise Those Convicted of a Crime, 21 RUTGERS L. REV.
297, 298-300 (1967).
101. See, e.g., Hilde Tubex, Dangerousness and Risk: From Belgian Posi-
tivism to New Penology (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
102. Courts have upheld restrictions on the First Amendment rights of
prison inmates. See Massachusetts Prisoners Ass'n Political Action Comm. v.
Cellucci, No. 97-6111-C, slip op. at 8 (Suffolk Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 1998) (up-
holding prohibition on formation of Political Action Committee within Massa-
chusetts prisons because of valid and legitimate penological interests).
103. "Voting is [] about expressing biases, loyalties, commitments, and per-
sonal values." Fletcher, supra note 99, at 1906.
104. "Excluding from -the electorate those who have felt the sting of the
criminal law obviously skews the politics of criminal justice toward one side of
the debate." Id.
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States may also exclude ex-offenders from the ballot box
based on an alleged conflict of interest. In states where judges
and prosecutors are elected, they may experience a conflict of
interest in prosecuting and sentencing offenders. However,
that is most likely an issue only in cases involving powerful and
well-connected defendants who have supported political cam-
paigns financially. Moreover, judges may encounter such con-
flicts of interest in civil litigation as well, and civil plaintiffs
and defendants are not excluded from voting in judicial elec-
tions.
An additional justification for disenfranchisement is that
ex-offenders are likely to commit election fraud. This fear is an
overbroad justification for denying ex-offenders voting rights.
Only a small number of all offenders are convicted of offenses
connected to election fraud. While even that group is presuma-
bly unlikely to constitute an ongoing threat to the integrity of
elections, there is no empirical basis for assuming that all of-
fenders are more likely to engage in election fraud than the rest
of the population.105 The fear-of-election-fraud justification is
also underinclusive because in some states that permanently
exclude offenders from the ballot, a number of election offenses
are grouped as misdemeanors and therefore do not lead to dis-
enfranchisement. 106
2. Judicial Approval of "Purity of the Ballot Box"
Despite the tenuousness of these arguments, the United
States Supreme Court has implicitly adopted them as indica-
tive of a rational exercise of state power. 10 7 Based on an analy-
sis of the express language in Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the historical situation at the time of its pas-
sage, the Court held that state laws that permanently disen-
franchise felons do not run afoul of the Equal Protection
Clause. 08 It found that the disenfranchisement of felons
105. Justice Marshall discusses these arguments in his dissenting opinion
in Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 79 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
His additional argument that the state has criminalized voting fraud and has
systems in place to detect and prosecute it, see id. at 79-80, denies the need
and the rationale for all measures that treat ex-offenders differently than
other voters.
106. See id. at 79.
107. See id. at 56 (denying equal protection challenge to ex-offender disen-
franchisement provision).
108. See id. at 41-56. The majority's reading of Section 2 has been harshly
attacked. See Shapiro, supra note 7, at 546 nn.50-51 (citing numerous com-
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should be tested under a rational basis standard because the
language in Section 2 permits states to disenfranchise those
convicted of rebellion or "other crimes."10 9 The Court's focus on
the text and the historical situation surrounding passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment prevented it from analyzing the state's
rationale in any detail.110
In recent years, lower courts have applied a more exacting
equal protection test to certain state provisions disenfranchis-
ing ex-offenders. In McLaughlin v. City of Canton,"' a federal
district court held that the state failed to provide a compelling
interest justifying its decision to disenfranchise a group of po-
tential electors solely because they were convicted of misde-
meanors. 112 The court applied the compelling interest test be-
cause Section 2 only covers felonies, not misdemeanors." 13
Despite such minor victories, the Supreme Court's decision
to analyze ex-offender disenfranchisement generally using a
lower level of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause sym-
bolizes that voting rights are a fundamental right of citizens
only as long as they are not convicted felons.
D. EFFECTS OF DISENFRANCHISEMENT
1. Disenfranchisement Creates Social and Civic Outcasts
The disenfranchisement of a large number of ex-offenders
is symbolic of the sentencing system in the United States. De-
nial of voting rights follows automatically upon conviction and
continues to affect the ex-offender's life long after his maximum
sentence expires. Such an excessive collateral consequence, es-
mentators who have criticized the majority opinion).
109. See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 51. Although the Fourteenth Amendment
in Section 2 refers to treason and other crimes, the statutes re-admitting the
Southern states into the union use the phrase "such crimes as are now felonies
at common law." That, however, was a narrowly circumscribed category at the
time. See infra note 139.
110. Justice Marshall in dissent argued that the majority's reasoning was
based on a flawed historical analysis. See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 56-86
(Marshall, J. dissenting); see also Daniel R. Ortiz, Pursuing a Perfect Politics:
The Allure and Failure of Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 721, 731 (1991) (ar-
guing that society is only upset by inaccurate subjective discrimination); Gary
Reback, Note, Disenfranchisement of Ex-felons: A Reassessment, 25 STAN. L.
REV. 845, 850-56 (1973) (arguing that Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment
does not support disenfranchisement of convicted felons).
111. 947 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Miss. 1995).
112. See id. at 973-76.
113. See id.
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pecially when combined with the magnitude and frequency of
prison sentences in the United States, belies the lip service
paid to retribution as the primary punishment goal. 14 Perma-
nent incapacitation, whether physically inside or outside soci-
ety, appears as the sole goal-with incapacitation not for pre-
ventive purposes but solely to exclude an offender from
society.1 15 Especially with respect to political rights, the words
of the court in People v. Russell still ring true today: an of-
fender is "an alien in his own country, and worse."1 16
Denial of voting rights creates permanent outcasts from
society, persons internally exiled who are left without any op-
portunity ever to regain their full status as citizens.' ' In that
respect such a collateral consequence continues the tradition of
exiling offenders from society. It merely replaces the primary
penalties of the past-transportation, banishment and depriva-
tion of citizenship.
Historically, civil death statutes judged not only the of-
fense but also the offender. Their modern day remnant contin-
ues to deny the offender's ability and opportunity to change and
to reintegrate herself."8 It labels the offender permanently
and irredeemably deviant."19 Therefore, disenfranchisement is
likely to entail a negative impact on the offender's resocializa-
tion, especially when combined with other exclusionary meas-
ures, such as employment restrictions and private discrimina-
tion. 120 Although the latter may more directly affect ex-
offenders in their daily lives, denial of voting rights is crucial
because of its symbolic meaning and its impact on democratic
rights of participation. The claim that ex-offender disenfran-
chisement is a non-issue since most ex-offenders would not vote
114. See Fletcher, supra note 99, at 1907.
115. While incapacitation is generally associated with imprisonment, an
1878 English bill used the term to prohibit convicted offenders from voting.
See JOHN S. JAMEs, III, STROUD'S JUDICIAL DICTIONARY 1329 (4th ed. 1973).
"The only rationale for disenfranchisement that makes sense is that felons, by
virtue of their crime and their conviction, forfeit their right to participate in
the political process." Fletcher, supra note 99, at 1899.
116. 91 N.E. 1075, 1075-76 (Ill. 1910).
117. See generally Demleitner, supra note 6; Fletcher, supra note 99; Ortiz,
supra note 110, at 731; Note, supra note 7.
118. See ESSER, supra note 22, at 89.
119. See Note, supra note 7, at 1310-11.
120. See Fletcher, supra note 99, at 1897. How an ex-offender experiences
such exclusionary mechanisms will depend on individual sensibilities. How-
ever, their recurrence, permanence and cumulative character are likely to im-
pact almost every ex-offender.
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even if permitted to do so, therefore, misses the mark inde-
pendent of its empirical accuracy. Democratic states do not
have the right to force voters to cast ballots but rather are
obliged to enable them to cast their ballot. Granting them the
legal right to vote is the most elementary prerequisite for full
participation and inclusion in a democracy.
2. Disenfranchisement Discriminates Against African-
American Ex-Offenders
The racially-tainted passage of some disenfranchisement
provisions and the disproportionate effect of voting restrictions
on African-Americans exert a negative impact on American so-
ciety. Legislation denying ex-offenders the right to vote has
been part of American law since the founding of this country.
However, the legal situation in the most exclusionary states,
many of which are in the South, is largely a consequence of Re-
construction and the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment
which granted former slaves the right to vote. Upon adoption
of the Reconstruction amendments, Southern states developed
means to disenfranchise blacks without violating the language
of the Fourteenth Amendment and losing their proportionate
representation in Congress. Among other methods of excluding
blacks from the ballot box, such as literacy tests and grandfa-
ther clauses, the Southern states passed legislation barring
those with certain criminal convictions from voting. Such ex-
clusions were constitutionally sanctioned because the Four-
teenth Amendment in Section 2 explicitly permitted the states
to exclude those convicted "for participation in rebellion, or
other crimes" from voting.121 However, the Southern states
carefully selected the offenses which were to trigger an exclu-
sion and focused on those they believed to be more widely
committed by blacks than whites. 122 That explains why, for ex-
ample, until 1972 the state of Mississippi did not automatically
exclude convicted rapists from the franchise-rape was consid-
ered a crime committed equally by black and white men.123
121. U.S. CONST. art. XIV, § 2.
122. The historical information presented here draws heavily on Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion in Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 41-55
(1974). See also Virginia E. Hench, The Death of Voting Rights: The Legal
Disenfranchisement of Minority Voters, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 727, 738-43
(1998); Shapiro, supra note 7, at 540-43.
123. See Shapiro, supra note 7, at 549.
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Convicted bigamists, however, were automatically excluded be-
cause bigamy was deemed a "black crime."124
Legal challenges based on the racially-tainted origin of
some disenfranchisement provisions have succeeded. For ex-
ample, in Hunter v. Underwood, the Supreme Court upheld an
equal protection challenge to a provision in the Alabama Con-
stitution which barred certain ex-offenders from the ballot-
box. 125 The Court found that Alabama's constitutional commis-
sion had passed the particular section, which appeared to be
racially neutral on its face, with the intent to discriminate
against African-Americans. 126 The provision focused on crimes
the constitutional commission considered more likely to be
committed by blacks which therefore would operate to block
more blacks than whites from voting. 2 7 After Hunter v. Un-
derwood, some states forestalled legal action against their dis-
enfranchisement regime by enlarging, not narrowing or abol-
ishing, their exclusion grounds. Such changes had the perverse
effect of causing more ex-offenders to be denied voting rights.
In light of the high percentage of African-American men
with criminal convictions, exclusionary legislation continues to
deny voting rights to blacks in disproportionate numbers. 28
Therefore, recent attacks on the exclusion of ex-offenders from
the ballot box have centered on the racially discriminatory im-
pact of such legislation. 129 However, courts have not been very
receptive to such challenges, which are being brought either
under the Fourteenth Amendment or the Voting Rights Act of
1965.130 Furthermore, congressional attempts to enact legisla-
124. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. City of Canton, 947 F. Supp. 954, 976-78 (S.D.
Miss. 1995) (undertaking, on the court's own motion, research into the history
of Mississippi's disenfranchisement provision).
Immediately after the Civil War and the liberation of slaves, blacks were
probably more likely than whites to engage in bigamy, as legally defined. By
allowing the sale of persons, slavery had severely upset family structures, in-
cluding marriages. Often slaves, whose spouses had been sold, remarried
without obtaining a divorce or confirming the death of their former spouse.
See Katherine Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of
African American Marriages, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251, 282-84, 305 (1999).
125. 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985).
126. See id. at 229-32.
127. See id. at 232.
128. See FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 4, at 8-11; Hench, supra note 122,
at 765-68; Harvey, supra note 7, at 1149-59.
129. For litigation strategy involving the Voting Rights Act, see generally
Harvey, supra note 7; Shapiro, supra note 7.
130. See Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919, 928-32 (2d Cir. 1996).
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tion that counteracts the effects of exclusionary legislation have
also proven unsuccessful. For example, a bill introduced in
Congress in the mid-1990s, which aimed at restoring voting
rights in federal elections to all ex-convicts who have been re-
leased from prison failed.'3 ' In addition to constitutional con-
cerns about whether a national law can override state voting
requirements, members of Congress might have found it diffi-
cult to vote for such legislation in an era when "toughness on
crime" is being extolled. However, driven by concerns about ra-
cial disparity, in recent months Congress held hearings on a
proposed bill H.R. 906, the Civic Participation and Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1999, which would eliminate disenfranchisement
provisions for federal elections.132
Despite the vicious impact of the denial of voting rights,
opposition in Congress and the legal profession against such
laws,133 and the lack of a persuasive justification in their favor,
disenfranchisement provisions have survived so far. However,
because of the impact of disenfranchisement on the political
community and on African-Americans in particular, we must
develop an alternative model that allows us to accommodate
some of the realistic concerns underlying the "purity of the
ballot box" argument with the promise of universal and equal
suffrage. 134 The German legal system presents an alternative
that provides a useful starting point for a comprehensive attack
131. See Voting Rights of Former Offenders Act, H.R. 568, 105th Cong.
(1997); H.R. 3028, 104th Cong. (1996); see also Shapiro, supra note 70, at 60.
132. Civic Participation and Rehabilitation Act of 1999, H.R. 906, 106th
Cong. (1999); see Right of Ex-Prisoners To Vote in Federal Elections: Hearings
on H.R. 906 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (testimony of Gillian E. Metzger, staff attor-
ney Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law).
133. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS 145 (1981) (standard 23-8.4); MODEL PENAL
CODE § 306.3(1) (1974); FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 4.
134. Article 25. Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity,
without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without
unreasonable restrictions:
(b) To vote.., at genuine periodic elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot,
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 999 U.N.T.S.
171, 179. The United States ratified the ICCPR on June 8, 1992. See FRANK
NEWMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW,
POLICY, AND PROCESS 41-42 (2d ed. 1996) (outlining the reservations, under-
standings and declarations the U.S. Senate added in consenting to ratification
of the Treaty).
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and sets out a potential framework for a more satisfactory ap-
proach to disenfranchisement. Unlike the modifications pre-
sented in the 1960s, which were based on rehabilitation as the
sole aim, the changes suggested here are grounded in concepts
of retribution and prevention as well as rehabilitation.
III. A COMPARATIVE CRITIQUE: OUTDATED,
OUTMODED AND IRRATIONAL
The coverage of offenses, the length of exclusions, and the
rationale provided for them indicate that disenfranchisement
laws in the United States are outdated and unjustified rem-
nants of a bygone era. The comparison and contrast between
the United States and German disenfranchisement provisions
and their alleged purposes are indicative of the way American
society conceives of and treats offenders. At most, the purposes
put forth in the United States to defend the continued existence
of the disenfranchisement of ex-offenders merit a limited exclu-
sion from the ballot box, akin to the German model.
A. THE COVERAGE OF DISENFRANCHISEMENT PROVISIONS AND
THEIR MODE OF IMPOSITION
While German law allows an offender to be deprived of
voting rights only in very limited cases and with explicit judi-
cial justification, American law casts a broad net. The exclu-
sion from voting rights often applies to all those convicted of
felonies, a large category in most states, those guilty of "infa-
mous crimes," or those convicted of certain enumerated of-
fenses, which also tend to encompass relatively minor offenses
that would not even be categorized as crimes (Verbrechen) in
Germany.
In the United States, the list of offenses that mandate de-
nial of voting iights developed randomly. Some of the crimes
indicate that concerns of the day drove the evolution of the in-
dex. In the congressional debates surrounding ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment, legislators made reference to the
need for banning pirates from the franchise. 135 Based on his-
torical experience, pirates were perceived as a threat to the ex-
istence of states and their territorial integrity. 36 In response
135. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 43, 46 (1974) (citing Representa-
tive Eckley of Ohio).
136. By the mid-nineteenth century, the European powers united against
privateering and piracy. "The maxim that pirata est hostice humani generis (a
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to the alleged threat emanating from Mormon "immorality,"
Congress and a number of states included polygamy as an of-
fense that led to mandatory disenfranchisement. 137 Not only
was polygamy viewed as morally odious, its practice by mem-
bers of the Mormon Church was also deemed an attack on pre-
vailing morality, and therefore on the foundations of the state
as a whole. 138
In the twentieth century, the addition of an array of new
offenses that are classified as felonies has broadened the scope
of disenfranchisement provisions. Many of these new offenses
are not "of odious character," but are an outgrowth of the
regulatory state. 139 While the scope of disenfranchisement pro-
visions has been broadened through this process, simultane-
ously the franchise has been gradually expanded. At the time
the Fourteenth Amendment was passed, primarily white prop-
erty-holding men over the age of twenty-one were permitted to
vote. In the twentieth century, women and those between
eighteen and twenty-one gained the legal right to vote. With
the prohibition on measures that inhibited African-Americans
and other minorities from casting their ballot, the franchise has
been opened to every adult citizen. At the same time, however,
the increase in the number of convicted felons has also widened
the pool of individuals who are effectively banned from voting.
In contrast to Germany, disenfranchisement in the United
States occurs automatically and is frequently only dependent
on the offense that is the basis of conviction rather than the
penalty imposed. The inflexibility surrounding the deprivation
of voting rights can be likened to mandatory minimum sen-
tencing laws, which apply upon conviction of a specific offense,
independent of the circumstances surrounding the commission
pirate is an enemy of the human race) had seeped from the treatises on inter-
national law into the political psyches of governments." Ethan A. Nadelman,
Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evaluation of Norms in International Society,
reprinted in TRANSNATIONAL CRIME 479, 490 (Nikos Passas ed., 1999).
137. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 348 (1890) (upholding Idaho stat-
ute that denies voting rights to any individual practicing or counseling polyg-
amy or bigamy); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 39-45 (1885) (upholding an
1882 congressional act that bars any man or woman practicing polygamy or
bigamy from voting).
138. See Otsuka v. Hite, 414 P.2d 412, 419 (Cal. 1966) (discussing Davis,
133 U.S. 333, and Murphy, 114 U.S. 15).
139. In discussing the term "felony at common law," the Otsuka court
pointed to its historical contingency. Typical felonies at common law were
"murder, manslaughter, mayhem, rape, arson, robbery, burglary, and lar-
ceny." Otsuka, 414 P.2d at 421 n.10.
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of the crime or the background of the offender. However, even
mandatory minimum sentences are imposed in open court by
the trial judge while disenfranchisement, which is mandatory
and automatic, requires neither judicial explanation nor men-
tion. "'Neither the judge nor the prosecutor usually feels called
upon to go into specific, individual consequences of conviction
and sentencing; they rely on counsel to relay these details to
his client and to his client's family."' 140 In most cases, defense
counsel does not live up to this expectation and does not men-
tion all the consequences of a criminal conviction when a client
enters into a plea bargain.
Because of the mode of imposition and the patchwork of
disenfranchisement provisions in the United States, the players
in the criminal justice system do not deem the loss of voting
rights part of the sentence in the way a fine or community
sanction would be viewed. This approach differs dramatically
from the German procedure where Nebenstrafen, such as the
loss of voting rights, must be factored into the overall sentence.
In light of the importance of the good of which the offender is
being deprived, this is the more rational and equitable ap-
proach.
B. PERMANENT VERSUS TEMPORARY EXCLUSION
The length of time for which an ex-offender may lose his
voting rights symbolizes the difference in attitude towards of-
fenders in both countries. The meaning of time is socially con-
structed, and whoever structures time within society exercises
power. 141 That power is no longer held on the local or the vil-
lage level where time was once regulated. Today, time is struc-
tured on the state level. 42 In fast-paced societies, such as
Germany and the United States, where time is frequently com-
pared to money, long-term deprivations of rights must be
viewed as more punitive and dishonorable than in a slower-
paced, agriculturally-based society where time may not be con-
ceptualized as having such preeminent value.
140. ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING 406 (2d ed. 1991) (quot-
ing DONALD J. NEUMAN, CONVICTION: A DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR
INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 209 (1966)).
141. See Helga Nowotny, Wer bestimmt die Zeit?, in WAS IST ZEIT? 81, 81-
86 (Kurt Weis ed., 1995).
142. See Kurt Weis, Zeitbild und Menschenbild: Der Mensch als Sch6pfer
und Opfer seiner Vorstellungen von Zeit, in WAS IST ZEIT?, supra note 141, at
23, 28.
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Consequently, in the sanctioning arena the state can use
time as an inclusionary or exclusionary mechanism. The latter
occurs if the judicial system, as arm of the state, permanently
restricts the freedom of offenders, thus denying them any pros-
pect of reintegration. Alternatively, by imposing short exclu-
sionary sanctions, the state expresses its confidence in eventual
reintegration and rehabilitation and invites the offender back
into a productive and fully integrated life in the community.
Even though the German disenfranchisement provision is
explicitly designed for infrequent use, it contains a relatively
short maximum exclusionary period of five years which can be
judicially reduced to one-half of that time. 143 Therefore, even
offenders who are perceived as a threat to the state are viewed
as redeemable and reintegratable. The United States, on the
other hand, seems to strive for long-term exclusion of offenders
from society and the political process. Permanent exclusion
from political participation seems only justifiable, however, if it
is based on solid penological rationales, such as retribution, in-
capacitation, deterrence or denunciation. The next section will
explore the justifications that underlie disenfranchisement in
Germany and the United States.
C. POTENTIAL PENOLOGICAL OBJECTIVES OF
DISENFRANCHISEMENT
The broad coverage of disenfranchisement provisions in the
United States, their automatic imposition, and their perma-
nence distinguish them dramatically from German law. Such
distinctions may be tracable to fundamentally different objec-
tives of the two countries' provisions. Should that not be the
case, however, the substantive and procedural differences be-
tween the provisions may not be defensible. If no "'compelling
or rational policy interest in denying former felons the right to
vote' is demonstrable, 144 the provisions must fall in their en-
tirety. If some purpose is discernible, the provisions should be
narrowly tailored to fulfill that goal.
The existence of a valid objective of section 45(5) has been
challenged in Germany. Much of the debate centers around the
issue whether disenfranchisement constitutes a collateral sen-
143. See § 45b StGB; see also SCHONKE & SCHRODER, supra note 47, at
634.
144. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 79 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting brief filed in opposition to the grant of certiorari by California's
Secretary of State).
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tencing consequence (Strafnebenfolge) or a collateral sanction
(Nebenstrafe). Although the distinction is fleeting in German
law, section 45(5) is generally classified as a collateral sanc-
tion. 145 This classification is important because only collateral
sanctions are subject to the general sentencing guidelines out-
lined in section 46 StGB. 146 Most importantly, section 46 fo-
cuses on the proportionality between the sanction imposed and
the offender's guilt. The imposition of collateral consequences,
on the other hand, does not depend on a finding of the of-
fender's guilt but rather can serve solely preventive goals. 47
The debate within German law over the classification of disen-
franchisement does not have to be resolved in this context.
Both approaches to the denial of voting rights are viable but
require different justifications.
In contrast to this discussion in German law, denial of the
franchise in the United States remains undertheorized and
unjustified as a sanction. Courts have developed multiple ac-
counts defending disenfranchisement provisions without pro-
viding a coherent framework. Some judicial decisions charac-
terize disenfranchisement as a regulatory determination of
voter qualifications; others consider it a civil sanction; a few
deem it a criminal penalty.
In Murphy v. Ramsey, for example, the Supreme Court up-
held the denial of the vote to practicing polygamists or biga-
mists. 148 The Court deemed the statute non-penal, since it did
not require a conviction as prerequisite to its application but
rather was triggered when someone had the status of having
multiple living spouses. Therefore, it characterized the statute
as merely setting out a necessary qualification to vote. 149 In
Trop v. Dulles, the Supreme Court in dicta again characterized
the loss of voting rights "as a nonpenal exercise of the power to
regulate the franchise."150 The plurality's argument that "the
purpose of [such a statute] is to designate a reasonable ground
145. See SCHWARZ, supra note 13, at 45.
146. See id. at 47.
147. See id.
148. 114 U.S. 15, 39-45 (1885).
149. See id. at 42-44.
150. 356 U.S. 86, 97 (1958) (plurality opinion) (holding denationalization of
native-born U.S. citizen after conviction for desertion in wartime violates the
Eighth Amendment); see also Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 197 (1898)
(holding that denial of medical license did not amount to punishment but
rather "the conviction of a felony is evidence of the unfitness of such persons
as a class'" (quoting Foster v. Police Comm'rs, 102 Cal. 483, 492 (1894))).
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of eligibility for voting," however, lacks explanatory power in
light of its finding that denationalization is a penal sanction.' 51
In an Eighth Amendment challenge to a state law denying
voting rights to ex-offenders, the Second Circuit deemed such
disenfranchisement a civil sanction. 152 Because disenfran-
chisement, therefore, does not constitute punishment, the court
concluded that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause does
not cover it. 153 Other courts, however, have either held disen-
franchisement to be punishment or have implied a proportion-
ality analysis which generally applies only to criminal punish-
ment. 54
In the United States and Germany, denial of the franchise
is best characterized as partial punishment. 55 The primary
justifications put forth for denial of the franchise to ex-
offenders in Germany and the United States appear identical.
Reinhaltung des dffentlichen Lebens and "purity of the ballot
box" seem to share similar attributes since both aim at guaran-
teeing the purity of public life. What does this mean, though?
151. Trop, 356 U.S. at 96-97.
152. See Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir. 1967).
153. See id. at 451-52. Alternatively, the court held that the founding fa-
thers did not consider disenfranchisement to be cruel and unusual punish-
ment since it existed when the Eighth Amendment was passed. See id. In ad-
dition, the court viewed the large number of states with such provisions as
indicative of the constitutionality of the ban on voting rights for ex-offenders.
See id.
154. See Otsuka v. Hite, 414 P.2d 412, 416 (Cal. 1966) (holding that dis-
qualification from the franchise is "an additional punishment for the crime").
The Supreme Court has repeatedly been confronted with the question of
whether a particular sanction constitutes punishment. See, e.g., California
Dep't of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 514 (1995) (holding that a Cali-
fornia statute which amends parole procedures did not increase the defen-
dant's punishment); Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767,
779-80 (1994) (examining whether Montana's drug tax is punishment or reve-
nue raising); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 251 (1980) (determining
that the monetary penalty imposed by the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act is not punitive); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 165 (1963)
(reviewing whether statutes that take away United States citizenship for
leaving the United States during a national emergency constitute punish-
ment). For a discussion of the civil-criminal distinction, see, for example,
Mary M. Chen, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies To Achieve
Criminal Law Objectives: Transcending and Understanding the Criminal-
Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325 (1991); Susan R. Klein, Redraw-
ing the Criminal-Civil Boundary, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 679 (1999).
155. See Note, The Need for Reform of Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement Laws,
83 YALE L.J. 580, 585 n.28 (1974) ("This is a particularly plausible interpreta-
tion for state laws which are contained in the 'penal' sections of their
codes . .. ").
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Because of international and domestic constraints on the selec-
tion of "virtuous" voters in both countries, the argument cannot
imply that democratic states may choose only those citizens as
voters who live up to a certain moral or educational standard.
Rather, the "purity of the ballot box" argument connotes pun-
ishment-related goals.' 56 Therefore, traditional penological
goals-rehabilitation, retribution, deterrence, denunciation, in-
capacitation-may illuminate the meaning of the propounded
standards. 57
1. Rehabilitation and Reintegration
There appears to be agreement in Germany and the United
States that the deprivation of voting rights does not rehabili-
tate offenders. The conclusion both countries draw from this
insight, however, differs dramatically. While Germany limits
the exclusionary sanction to a few exceptional situations, the
United States appears to have discarded the goal of rehabilita-
tion entirely.158
Rather than being a goal of the denial of voting rights, dis-
enfranchisement provisions may be designed so as to facilitate
or impede rehabilitation. The limited coverage of section 45(5)
in Germany, for example, allows for the quick reintegration of
those convicted offenders who were not denied the franchise.
Moreover, even the small number of those excluded from politi-
cal rights will regain them after a relatively short period of
time. Finally, the German law explicitly allows for shortening
the period of disenfranchisement upon a showing of rehabilita-
tion. In contrast, American law appears to be aimed at almost
156. For a different normative analysis, see Andrew von Hirsch & Martin
Wasik, Civil Disqualifications Attending Conviction: A Suggested Conceptual
Framework, 56 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 599, 601 (1997). The authors treat civil dis-
qualifications, including denial of the franchise, as civil measures designed to
manage risk. See id.
157. For potential issues arising under the U.S. Constitution from the clas-
sification of disenfranchisement as punishment, see generally Reback, supra
note 110.
158. See Thomas Weigend, "Neoklassizismus"-ein transatlantisches Miss-
verstindnis, 94 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT
(ZSTW) 801, 802 (1982). Despite appearances, this is not accurate. Drug
courts, for example, indicate that rehabilitation continues to exist as a goal.
However, retributive and deterrent concepts have modified rehabilitation
dramatically. See, e.g., Sue Rex, A New Form of Rehabilitation?, in
PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY & POLICY 34, 34-41 (Andrew
von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter PRINCIPLED
SENTENCING].
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the opposite effect. It makes the rehabilitation of a large num-
ber of offenders largely illusory and holds out to them only a
limited possibility of ever regaining voting rights. Therefore,
disenfranchisement cannot even operate as a "stick," a means
of specific deterrence.
The imposition of limitations or the abolition of disenfran-
chisement based on rehabilitative concerns alone might be con-
vincing if rehabilitation continued to be a preeminent sentenc-
ing goal in the United States. 159 Today, however, the potential
attainment of penological aims other than rehabilitation is
more persuasive in bringing about a decline in disenfranchise-
ment provisions.
2. Stigmatization and Denunciation
In 1957 the International Congress of Criminal Law de-
manded the abolition of collateral consequences aimed only at
degrading the offender.' 60 Loss of civil rights was among the
specific examples mentioned.' 61 In recent years, however,
stigmatization and shaming have been increasingly advocated
as sentencing goals. 162 Denial of the franchise may accomplish
these goals because it creates feelings of guilt within the of-
fender. 63 Such emotions, however, may lead to the offender's
further exclusion from society or at least an inability to reinte-
grate. 16
On the other hand, stigma may sometimes be positive be-
cause it can operate as a deterrent. 165 However, it can fulfill
159. For an account of the decline of the rehabilitative system, see MOORE,
supra note 90, at 66-72.
160. See Mirjan R. Damaska, Adverse Legal Consequences of Conviction
and Their Removal: A Comparative Study, 59 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY &
POLICE Sci. 347, 354 (1968).
161. See id.
162. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 591, 630-52 (1996). Substantial resistance has also developed
against the use of such penalties, however. See generally Toni Massaro,
Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880 (1991).
163. Shame requires an audience; guilt is internal. See Massaro, supra
note 162, at 1900-03. Shaming is also culture dependent. See id. at 1904.
Thus, if offenders belong to a (sub-)culture that does not value voting, they
may not be ashamed. See id. at 1904-05.
164. Denial of the franchise to African-Americans alienated them increas-
ingly from the political and legal system. See, e.g., Neil P. Cohen & Dean Hill
Rivkin, Civil Disabilities: The Forgotten Punishment, 35 FED. PROBATION,
June 1971, at 19, 25.
165. See NIGEL WALKER, SENTENCING-THEORY, LAW AND PRACTICE 426
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this function successfully only if the period of stigmatization is
limited in time and the stigma is imposed publicly. It will be of
value primarily in situations where the individual constitutes a
safety risk. The public character of the stigma will deter the
offender's involvement in high-risk activity because regulating
authorities, including employers, will exclude him preemp-
tively. Although disenfranchisement may operate in this man-
ner in Germany, it is unlikely to have the same effect in the
United States. As a hidden process that befalls a large number
of citizens, denial of voting rights is unlikely to impose any
public stigma. 66
This may not have been always true. Historically, the dep-
rivation of the franchise for ex-offenders was instituted at a
time when only very few had the right to vote. 167 The sanction
was only used against select individuals, generally property-
holding men whose violations of the criminal law may have
been viewed as a more serious infringement against the state
since they were the primary political and economic beneficiar-
ies of the existing regime. The additional penalty fit into the
framework of just deserts but also constituted a warning to
others in equally elevated social positions. 68 Denial of voting
rights denounced the offender and his actions in a particularly
stigmatizing and deterrent manner. 169 This justification, how-
ever, no longer applies.
(1985).
166. See Massaro, supra note 162, at 1883 (noting that among other pre-
requisites, for shaming to be effective, "the shaming must be communicated to
the group").
167. The stigmatizing and deterrent effect of such sanctions was also mag-
nified at that time because most individuals lived in small communities in
which all inhabitants were likely to have known the offender or his family.
See Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note 72, at 726-27.
168. The mort civile in France, which declared an offender legally dead,
served such deterrent purposes. See WEITHASE, supra note 17, at 89; see also
Ex-Offenders Voting Rights Act: Hearings on H.R. 9020 Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 29 (1974) (testimony of the Hon. John R.
Dunne, State Senator, State of New York, member, ABA Commission on Cor-
rectional Facilities and Services) [hereinafter Ex-Offenders Voting Rights Act].
John Locke once noted that "'[tihe being rightfully possessed of great
power and riches.., is so far from being an excuse [for unlawful oppression],
that it is a great aggravation of it.. . .'" KELLY, supra note 72, at 240 (quoting
JOHN LOCKE, LEVIATHAN). Although Locke's remarks applied to misgovern-
ment, they can be extended to cover and justify the additional punishment of
the rich and powerful.
169. Sutherland and Cressey, for example, list civil death, infamy and the
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3. Deterrence
Germany and the United States list deterrence among
their sentencing goals. However, because both countries treat
denial of the franchise as an additional sanction-supple-
menting imprisonment in most cases-the added deterrent
value of the denial of the franchise is questionable. This holds
particularly true for the United States. While German courts
will publicly announce a sentence that includes disenfran-
chisement, the collateral character of the sanction in the
United States relegates it to the margins. Since even the exis-
tence of the sanction is widely unknown, 170 it cannot be ex-
pected to have a general deterrent character. However, greater
publicity of disenfranchisement as a sanction and its inclusion
in an actual sentencing order may raise its profile and deter-
rent value.' 7 ' Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the penalty-in
either country-would be a powerful deterrent. If the primary
sentences threatening the offender-long-term imprisonment
by the respective standards of the two countries-do not act as
sufficient deterrents, disenfranchisement will not either.172
4. Retribution
Retribution has historically served as a justification for
collateral sentencing consequences because "those who broke
the rules of society were forced to forfeit the rights and privi-
loss of voting rights under "social degradation." EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND &
DONALD R. CRESSEY, CRIMINOLOGY 308-09 (8th ed. 1970).
170. See Note, supra note 7, at 1307; cf. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 112
(1958) (Brennan, J., concurring). But see John P. Reed & Dale Nance, Society
Perpetuates the Stigma of a Conviction, 36 FED. PROBATION, June 1972, at 27,
30 (citing a localized study from 1971 showing that "[t]he public has some
knowledge of 'civil disability.' That knowledge, however, is not particular-
ized.").
Based on personal conversations with German law faculty, I have con-
cluded that even in Germany knowledge of the existence of disenfranchise-
ment as a sanction is tenuous. This is the case even though section 45 is part
of the German Criminal Code.
171. Any general deterrence argument is based on the disputed concept of
individuals as rational actors who will assess costs, including potential pun-
ishment, and benefits prior to engaging in any (criminal) action.
172. Cf. Trop, 356 U.S. at 112 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("And as a deter-
rent [denationalization] would appear of little effect, for the offender, if not de-
terred by thought of the specific penalties of long imprisonment or even death,
is not very likely to be swayed from his cotirse by the prospect of expatria-
tion.").
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leges of that society."73 Section 45(5) of the German Criminal
Code is at least partly built on that notion. It applies only to
those offenders who have undermined the foundation of the
state by committing acts targeted directly either at its contin-
ued existence or at the validity of free elections. 174 The court
may only deprive an offender of the franchise if the sanction is
proportionate to the offense committed. Moreover, the length
of the exclusionary period must be proportionate to the gravity
of the offense.IV5
In the United States it has become fashionable to empha-
size retribution as an important, if not primary, punishment
goal. 176 Retribution exacts punishment commensurate to the
offense on the offender. Furthermore, it expresses disapproval
and revulsion at the crime so as to satisfy emotional and moral
needs of justice. 77 Retribution is not only tied to the notion of
"just deserts" but also serves a limiting function. In most cases,
it cannot therefore be used to justify the disproportionately
long or permanent exclusion of an offender from membership in
a democratic society.'78 A lasting denial of rights turns the ex-
offender into one permanently dishonored rather than forgiven
upon serving his penalty. 79 This criticism has even been
raised against the much more limited deprivatioi of voting
rights in Germany. 180
The length of disenfranchisement may be only one factor
indicating the lack of proportionality of this sanction. In the
United States, the categories of "felony" or "infamous crime" in-
clude numerous serious and a panoply of less serious offenses.
Regardless of their seriousness, all these offenses can lead to
the automatic and often permanent ban on voting rights. The
173. Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note 72, at 726.
174. See, e.g., SCHWARZ, supra note 13, at 49-54 (listing offenses which al-
low a judge to disenfranchise an offender at sentencing).
175. See FISCHER, supra note 59, at 69-70; SCHWARZ, supra note 13, at 47;
TRONDLE & FISCHER, supra note 41, at 289-90.
176. See MOORE, supra note 90, at 72-76.
177. See Massaro, supra note 162, at 1891.
178. On proportionality and desert as a limitation on punishment, see gen-
erally NORVAL MORRIS, PUNISHMENT, DESERT, AND REHABILITATION (1977)
and Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionate Sentences: A Desert Perspective, in
PRINCIPLED SENTENCING, supra note 158, at 168, 168-79. Von Hirsch and
Wasik have also proposed "'outer' proportionality constraints" for civil dis-
qualifications. Von Hirsch & Wasik, supra note 156, at 612-15.
179. See Nelles, supra note 29, at 19.
180. See id.
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scope of these categories is too broad to fulfill the proportional-
ity requirement which is part of retributive sanctioning.181 The
same holds true for some of the crimes enumerated in state
constitutions as mandating disenfranchisement. For example,
the permanent disenfranchisement of a convicted bigamist
might be considered excessive.
Courts in the United States have occasionally viewed a de-
nial of the franchise as retributive and judged its severity
against the offense committed. In Weems v. United States, for
example, the Supreme Court applied a proportionality analysis
to strike down a sentence that included a life-long voting ban
based on a conviction for the falsification of public docu-
ments. 8 2 Yet the Supreme Court cannot be counted on to es-
tablish a proportionality scale even though retributivism re-
quires the scaling of offenses. 183
If denial of the franchise were viewed as retributive, it
would have to be factored into an overall sentence that is pro-
portionate to the offense. In light of its exclusionary character,
the sanction would have to be assessed sparingly. Therefore, it
might be advisable to impose it only on a select group of offend-
ers whose actions were aimed at undermining the democratic
character of the state. For those offenders the deprivation of
181. Denial of the franchise has also been attacked because of its disparate
effect on individual offenders. That argument proves too much, however, as it
applies to any type of sanction. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 5H1.4 (1998) (stating that physique is not "ordinarily relevant" in
departing from the guideline range). Some appellate courts have nevertheless
upheld downward departures under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines based
on the disparate impact of a prison sentence on an offender. See, e.g., Koon v.
United States, 518 U.S. 81, 111-12 (1996) (upholding a downward departure
for former police officers who would be unusually susceptible to abuse in
prison); United States v. Graham, 83 F.3d 1466, 1480-81 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(noting that extreme vulnerability to abuse in prison may justify a downward
departure); United States v. Pokuaa, 782 F. Supp. 747, 748 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)
(departing downward for a pregnant defendant who would have lost her pa-
rental rights otherwise).
182. 217 U.S. 349, 346-65, 380-82 (1910).
183. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991) (holding that a
life sentence for a first offender convicted of possession of a large amount of
cocaine does not violate the Eighth Amendment's proportionality require-
ment). The Court focused not only on whether the sentence is "cruel" but on
whether it is "cruel and unusual." Id. (emphasis added). Under this test, the
denial of voting rights would not pass muster because it was a penalty known
at the time the Constitution was signed. For an account of the Rehnquist
Court's treatment of excessive sentences, see CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, THE
REHNQUIST COURT AND CRIMINAL PUNIsHMENT 39-56 (1997).
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democratic voting rights could be deemed just, equitable and
proportionate to their offense.
Alternatively, the sanction could be imposed on a larger
group of lawbreakers, akin to the deprivation of the driver's li-
cense of those offenders who are punished not for driving of-
fenses but for other misdeeds. In the United States, Germany
and England, this sanction operates as a retributive punish-
ment that restricts the offender's liberty.184 The Minister of
State at the (English) Home Office likened this penalty to a fine
or a community service sentence which restricts personal eco-
nomic liberty and the freedom to spend one's time as one
chooses. 1s5 As a punitive measure, the length of the depriva-
tion must be proportionate to the gravity of the offense commit-
ted.186 A similar approach might be employed with respect to
the denial of the franchise which could then be officially
deemed a supplemental penalty and would have to be counted
as part of the overall punishment assessed. It should be noted,
however, that the deprivation of a driver's license as an addi-
tional penalty is usually connected to the offense of conviction.
Generally, the offender used a car to commit a crime. 8 7 Analo-
gously, deprivation of the franchise should be applied only
when the criminal's action misused the franchise, either di-
rectly or indirectly.
Alternatively, one could argue in favor of extending disen-
franchisement to all those who abused their privilege of citizen-
ship, i.e., all offenders. This conclusion is of dubious validity,
however, because citizenship and the franchise are considered
rights' 88 while a driving permit is viewed as a privilege. The
overall analogy between deprivation of voting rights and driv-
ers' licenses might encounter constitutional difficulties because
the values of driving and voting as indicia of citizenship and
membership in society differ dramatically. Even though defini-
tions of democracy vary, there is general agreement that at its
center are general elections which reflect the will of the elec-
184. See, e.g., RICHARD WARD, CRIMINAL SENTENCING: THE NEW LAW 142-
43 (1997).
185. See id. at 143 (citing the Minister of State at the Home Office).
186. See, e.g., D.A. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING 351 (2d ed. 1979).
187. See, e.g., BGHSt 44, 228 (228-33) (revoking the driver's license of a
convicted rapist because the rape was committed in the offender's car).
188. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 179.
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torate. 189 Doubts about the validity of disenfranchisement
counsel more against the use of this sanction at all rather than
in favor of its current broad application.
To sum up, denial of the franchise can be viewed as an ap-
propriate retributive sanction but only if it is subject to a strin-
gent proportionality analysis applied with respect to offenses
that carry such a penalty and the length of the exclusionary pe-
riod imposed.
5. Incapacitation, Prevention and Protection of the Public
Because denial of the franchise excludes a large group of
ex-offenders from political participation in the United States,
its purpose may be incapacitative. The protection of the polls
from tampering could be deemed of such preeminent value in a
democracy that it deserves powerful protection. In Germany
and the United States, disenfranchisement may serve this
function because it enables the state to deny voting rights to
those who could potentially endanger the integrity of elections.
The denial of voting rights in Germany performs more than
an incapacitating and preventive function since the legislation
is primarily based on retributive goals. Nevertheless, the ar-
gument of the Reinhaltung des 6ffentlichen Lebens and the
generally more restrictive interpretation of freedom of political
speech in Germany than in the United States may be indicative
of a partially protective function of this provision. However,
the restrictive German legislation keeps the number of offend-
ers excluded from the franchise to protect the public interest
small. As German law recognizes, voting bans for reasons of
public safety may be legitimate only when the offender is con-
victed of severe voting fraud. Even offenders sentenced in con-
nection with offenses committed by terroristic organizations or
traitors generally do not constitute a sufficient threat to elec-
tions or democratic principles to justify denying them the fran-
chise on preventive grounds.
On the other hand, even the voting fraud rationale may no
longer mandate denial of the franchise. In the United States
the occurrences of large-scale fraud at the ballot box have de-
clined dramatically in the wake of civil and voters' rights leg-
189. See SCHWARZ, supra note 13, at 95; see also Haig v. Canada (1993]
D.L.R. 577, 613 ("All forms of democratic government are founded upon the
right to vote. Without that right, democracy cannot exist.")
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islation passed in the 1960s. 190 Today, allegations of election
fraud are generally raised in connection with the voting of non-
citizens. 19l In the United States, however, non-citizens gener-
ally cannot be deprived of the franchise since, by definition,
they do not have it. Moreover, stable democracies, such as
Germany and the United States, do not have to be concerned
about large-scale anti-democratic attacks by ex-offenders
through the ballot box.
To sum up, voting restrictions are largely ineffective as
preventive mechanisms. Both Germany and the United States
have passed more potent legislation to address threats to their
democratic foundation. The prohibition on political parties
which threaten the integrity of the German state, for example,
makes it virtually impossible for the voter to endanger the exis-
tence of the prevailing political order and values through the
franchise. 192 Similarly, the United States has passed legisla-
tion that makes it a crime to advocate the forcible overthrow of
government or to become a member of an organization that ad-
heres to such advocacy or teaching. 193 Moreover, both countries
make it impossible for certain offenders to be elected to public
office. 194 Such exclusion, if based on a risk assessment, will be
more effective as a safety measure than the denial of the fran-
chise.
Even if we grant denial of the franchise some incapacita-
tive function, disenfranchisement provisions in the United
States are overbroad. They include large numbers of offenses
which cannot be construed as attacks on the democratic sys-
tem. Therefore, most offenders do not pose a risk to the foun-
dation of our government or to the integrity of public elections.
In addition, American law fails to allow for an individualized
190. See Ex-Offenders Voting Rights Act, supra note 168, at 30 (testimony
of the Hon. John R. Dunne, State Senator, State of New York, member, ABA
Commission on Correctional Facilities and Services); see also Douglas R. Tims,
Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: A Cruelly Excessive Punishment, 7
Sw. U. L. REV. 124, 135 (1975).
191. See, e.g., Thomas D. Elias, Democrats in Peril of Losing California
Congressional Seats, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1998, at A4 (stating that former
Congressman Dornan charged election fraud claiming that non-citizens had
voted in congressional race); Jean 0. Pasco, Latino Groups Appreciate New
Guide for Voters, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1998, at B1 (recognizing that officials
were cleared of the charges of fraudulently registering voters before they be-
came citizens).
192. See SCHWARZ, supra note 13, at 90.
193. See 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1994).
194. See 5 U.S.C. § 7313 (1994).
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assessment of dangerousness. 195 In contrast, when imposing
disenfranchisement as a collateral sanction, a German court
has the opportunity to assess the individualized threat an of-
fender poses. The German sentencing judge may also have a
second occasion to consider the danger an offender poses to the
democratic order because the German ex-offender sentenced
under section 45(5) may petition the Court to have his sentence
ended prematurely. 196 To be persuasive, he must show that he
no longer presents a threat, which implies in most cases that he
has been rehabilitated. If designed as a safety measure, cur-
rent U.S. legislation is overinclusive since it is not based on an
individual assessment of risk at sentencing but rather on a
generalized assumption that all felons pose a threat to the
democratic order and free elections.
As preventive measures, registration and notification stat-
utes are comparable to voting restrictions. Both are preemi-
nent examples of risk-based legislation that affects offenders
after they have served their sentences. 197 However, many sex
offender registration statutes are much more narrowly drawn
than disenfranchisement provisions. Although the federal reg-
istration statute, for example, applies automatically, it covers
only those who committed several offenses against children or
violent sexual offenses. Moreover, it distinguishes between two
risk groups. One is subject to a registration period of ten years;
the other, consisting of recidivists, those who committed an ag-
gravated form of the enumerated offenses, and those adjudged
sexually violent predators, is subject to life-long registration.198
195. Gubernatorial pardons could be viewed as an official declaration that
the ex-offender no longer poses a danger to society and can be considered re-
habilitated. They are a reward for those who have succeeded in reintegrating
themselves and in ordering their lives so as to accord with the principles of so-
ciety. The post-hoc pardon procedure, however, remains driven by numerous
considerations, many unrelated to safety goals.
196. See § 45b StGB; see also SCHONKE & SCHRODER, supra note 47, at
634.
197. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (1994) (adopting a registration program for
sexually violent offenders and those who commit crimes against children).
198. See id. § 14071(b)(6) (providing for the length of the registration pe-
riod). Although one can challenge the overall wisdom and specific line-
drawing of this statute, it illustrates the overbreadth and lack of differentia-
tion present in the disenfranchisement provisions.
The English sex offender notification statue is tied to both the offense of
conviction and the length of imprisonment imposed. In that respect, it resem-
bles the German disenfranchisement provision which requires conviction of a
specific offense and imposition of at least a six-month prison term. Only a
sentence of thirty months or more will lead to an indefinite notification period
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The registration period for the former group is shorter than the
exclusion from the ballot-box for many non-violent offenders.
Despite distinct preventive needs and the different character of
disenfranchisement and registration legislation, disenfran-
chisement provisions have a dramatically broader scope and
longer-lasting impact than registration statutes.
D. SUMMARY
This comparative analysis indicates that under certain cir-
cumstances disenfranchisement of offenders may serve valid
penological goals. In the United States, however, they are not
coherently, rationally and clearly developed, and are concealed
behind the "purity of the ballot box" argument. As currently
designed, the German model is likely to fulfill the primary pe-
nological goal of retribution, as well as serving some deterrent
and incapacitative functions while facilitating the offender's so-
cietal reintegration. The same cannot be said of the American
legislation, which primarily has an exclusionary effect.
IV. A NEW AND PRINCIPLED APPROACH
The above analysis and comparison of the justifications for
disenfranchisement support the conclusion that the denial of
the right to vote in the United States is overinclusive and over-
broad. It serves no distinct penological purpose and denies
democratic participation to a large group of individuals, many
of whom are racial minorities.
Most of the federal and state courts that have confronted
the constitutionality of disenfranchisement provisions have up-
held them. 199 Even though novel and untested theories con-
tinue to be developed, 200 courts are unlikely to invalidate the
denial of voting rights to felons. Therefore, legislative action
offers a more promising approach for reform, since disenfran-
chisement presents normative questions that fall squarely into
the legislative realm. Although congressional legislation pres-
ents a potential avenue, concerns about its constitutionality
render this approach tenuous and leave state legislative action
as the most plausible alternative. 201 In recent decades, a few
under England's registration statute for sexual offenders. See WARD, supra
note 184, at 103.
199. See supra notes 107-13, 130 and accompanying text.
200. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 99, at 1903-06.
201. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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legislatures have abolished disenfranchisement provisions, and
others might be likely to follow if strong support can be built on
the state level.
Disenfranchisement laws in the United States can and
should be remodeled to comply with pre-selected primary sen-
tencing goals. Although a small group of offenders may, under
certain circumstances, be excluded from the franchise for re-
tributive and preventive reasons, such an extreme collateral
consequence should not be imposed upon the majority of ex-
offenders. 20 2 New legislation must also consider secondary ob-
jectives, such as the impact of denunciation and rehabilitation.
In proposing more effective disenfranchisement legislation,
this Article will draw heavily on the German model but at-
tempt to improve on its shortcomings. Beneficial side effects of
Germany's more rational approach to the denial and automatic
restoration of voting rights would be consistency and coher-
ence.203 Neither is present in the current system which is
characterized by omissions, oversights and inconsistencies.
This change would be of special relevance to federal offenders
who are frequently excluded from the restoration of voting
rights because state election laws fail to address their situa-
tion.2°4 Legislative changes in this area would also carry strong
expressive power, symbolizing society's identity as democratic
and inclusive.
Legislative changes would not be as urgent if the pardon-
ing system worked equitably and quickly to restore the voting
rights of offenders.20 5 Because that is not the case, however,
the United States should not rely on its current pardoning sys-
tem as a solution to the disenfranchisement of a large number
of offenders. An automatic restoration procedure which oper-
ates upon release from imprisonment presents a better ap-
proach because it can mitigate the harshness of the sanction.
202. See PAUL W. TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE AND CORRECTION 429 (1960)
(arguing for the abolition of punitive disabilities but allowing for the limited
use of supplemental sanctions to protect community welfare).
203. For a discussion of the expressive power of the law, see Jean Hamp-
ton, Punishment, Feminism, and Political Identity: A Case Study in the Ex-
pressive Meaning of the Law, 11 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 23, 23 (1998).
204. See OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, supra note 80, at 2-3.
205. For arguments in favor of an expanded role for pardons in an era of
harsh and inflexible sentencing laws, see MOORE, supra note 90. Moore finds
pardons justified "when the lingering effects of a felony conviction add pun-
ishment beyond what is deserved." Id. at 168; see also Kobil, supra note 90, at
573-75.
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Still, such an approach fails to remedy some of the other prob-
lems associated with the existing legal framework.
A. ADDRESSING THE PURPOSES OF DISENFRANCHISEMENT
Denial of the franchise should be made an explicit part of
the sentence and imposed in open court. Such a change would
have two important consequences. First, it would clarify the
character of the sanction as penal rather than administrative
and indicate its seriousness and severity. It would indicate to
the offender that a criminal conviction impacts her fundamen-
tal role as a citizen because it removes the most important
right implicit in citizenship.2°6 Including the denial of the fran-
chise in the sentence imposed will also emphasize the impor-
tance of voting rights to the offender and society at large. The
meaning of democratic participation will be put on the same
level as explicit restrictions on individual freedom through in-
carceration. This sanction may then serve to reinforce society's
perception of its identity as a democratic nation built on princi-
ples of equal and universal voting rights. Second, as a sanc-
tion, disenfranchisement requires justification within the ex-
isting penological framework. Although retribution as the
primary sentencing goal should frame the sanction's outer pa-
rameters, secondary sentencing aims can help define it more
carefully.
1. Retributive Goals
To accord with the currently predominant penological
framework, retribution with a strong proportionality measure
should be selected as the primary goal in the denial of voting
rights. The German example can serve as a model. The poten-
tial deprivation of voting rights must be listed in the criminal
code as an additional sanction and must be tied to the gravity
of the offense. When the court assesses a sentence, it should
consider collateral consequences as part of the overall sanction
that must be factored into the proportionality analysis. As a
retributive sanction proportionate to the offense committed, the
206. See also Damaska, supra note 160, at 347 (arguing that the adverse
consequences flowing from a conviction are often unknown, even to partici-
pants in the criminal justice system, because they are frequently scattered
through different bodies of law); cf SCHNWARZ, supra note 13, at 61 (stating
that removing the provision for Nebenstrafen from the German Criminal Code
would create a "'visually incorrect impression").
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deprivation of voting rights should be used sparingly and tied
to offenses that threaten the democratic foundation of the state.
Under a retributive framework, treason, for example, could
carry disenfranchisement as a possible supplemental penalty.
Historically, traitors were considered to have forfeited their
status as citizens and could be denationalized.2 7 Even though
that is no longer the case, traitors are banned under federal
law from holding public office. 20 8 Under certain circumstances,
disenfranchisement may, therefore, be an appropriate addi-
tional punishment for someone convicted of treason.
The case of Gilbert Green demonstrates why this is so.
Green was convicted of "having conspired to organize the
Communist Party as a group to teach and advocate the over-
throw and destruction of the government by force and violence,
and to advocate and teach the duty and necessity of over-
throwing and destroying the government by such means."209
He demanded that the New York statute barring ex-offenders
from voting be struck down, but the court denied his request in
an opinion written by Judge Friendly.210 Under the scheme
proposed in this Article, a court may have found that the man-
ner in which Green committed the offense constituted a suffi-
cient attack on the foundation of the state to impose a tempo-
rary voting ban.
In many states, existing laws could be modified relatively
easily. Many states already enumerate treason and election-
related offenses as bases for disenfranchisement. 211 For those
offenses, the possibility of disenfranchisement should be ex-
plicitly listed as a sanction in the criminal code. Reference to
other offenses, such as "felonies," "offenses punishable by im-
prisonment," and "infamous crimes," should be removed as
general grounds for a denial of the franchise.
In light of the dislocations mandatory minimum sentences
have caused, even disenfranchisement tied to the offense of
conviction should not be mandatory. Instead, the German
model of discretionary denial of voting rights should be
207. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 73, at 747.
208. Some states explicitly list treason as an offense that triggers an auto-
matic denial of voting rights. For a selective listing, see Harvey, supra note 7,
at 1147.
209. Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 447 (2d Cir. 1967) (quoting
the federal statute then applicable).
210. See id. at 452.
211. See supra note 208.
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adopted, because it allows the sentencing court to assess the
appropriate individual sentence in light of the offense of convic-
tion, the circumstances surrounding it, and the individual of-
fender. To restrict the individual predilections of sentencing
judges, legislatures may want to require a minimum prison
sentence as the court's threshold inquiry for consideration of
disenfranchisement. In addition, appellate courts should de-
velop guidelines to provide guidance to lower courts. 212
Finally, the sentencing court must be given some flexibility
with respect to the number of years it can disenfranchise an of-
fender. A range of years with either a low or no minimum is
most desirable. While the two to five year period chosen in
Germany may not be acceptable in the United States, the im-
position of a life-long ban on voting rights should be rare, if al-
lowed at all. Nevertheless, it could be expected that the legisla-
tively permitted duration of disenfranchisement will be longer
in the United States than in Germany.213
Such sentencing flexibility is potentially more important in
the United States than in Germany. The German criminal
code is logically structured and based on serious doctrinal
analysis. This is not true for criminal codes in the United
States, which have not been subjected to an equally stringent
analysis, even though those codes based on the Model Penal
Code have been arranged more logically than the others. Many
states, for example, classify election offenses as both misde-
meanors and felonies. If a convicted felon commits acts more
akin to a misdemeanor, the sentencing court should be left with
the discretion to reject disenfranchisement. 21 4
212. See infra Part IV.B.
213. Differences among the states indicate that the United States does not
have a uniform sentencing culture. Therefore, durational limitations on disen-
franchisement may vary between states.
214. Cf Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1972) (criti-
cizing Washington state's disenfranchisement regime as irrational because it
tied the denial of voting rights to the nature of the punishment); Otsuka v.
Hite, 414 P.2d 412, 422 (Cal. 1966) (asserting that the nature of punishment
cannot determine whether someone is "a threat to the integrity of the elective
process" because it is based on "indeterminate sentences and [the] prolifera-
tion of technical, malum prohibitum offenses"); Mirjan R. Damaska, Adverse
Legal Consequences of Conviction and Their Removal: A Comparative Study
(Part 2), 59 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 542, 553 (1968) (arguing
that it is preferable to tie occupational disqualifications to specific offenses
rather than to the punishment imposed, and that automatic disqualifications,
if permitted at all, should be narrowly targeted).
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2. Secondary Sentencing Goals
While retributive goals should determine the outer pa-
rameters of the sanctioning scheme, other penological aims
should help define its details and procedures. For denunciatory
and deterrent purposes, public imposition of the sentence is
crucial. The existence and limited use of the sanction should
indicate that offenders who attack the foundation of govern-
ment deserve particular moral outrage. Rehabilitation, even as
a secondary or tertiary sentencing goal, should prevent long-
term denials of voting rights. Incapacitation and prevention
can help select the offenses which may trigger denial of the
franchise. 215
Due to the limited threat most offenders pose to the foun-
dation of the state, the option of a solely non-penal, safety-
based restriction on voting rights seems unnecessary. 216 If,
however, security and prevention are among the primary aims
of the denial of the franchise, the offender should be given the
opportunity to petition for a premature end of the disenfran-
chisement period. As long as she indicates that she no longer
poses a threat to the state, her continued exclusion would be
unjustified.
If the denial of the franchise is to serve solely as a protec-
tive measure, it must accord with the principles laid down in
Kansas v. Hendricks in which the Supreme Court upheld a civil
commitment statute for sexual offenders.2 17 Hendricks demon-
strated that liberty is presumed to be of the highest value in
society.218 The basic right of a citizen to participate in the
democratic process should be accorded a similarly high value as
to warrant substantive due process protections. Consequently,
disenfranchisement solely on preventive grounds should be
215. For a discussion of the prerequisites of an incapacitative sentence, see
A.E. Bottoms & Roger Brownsword, Incapacitation and "Vivid Danger," in
PRINCIPLED SENTENCING, supra note 158, at 105-06. The authors state that:
Given the present state of the predictive art in relation to
dangerousness sentences (a false positive rate of up to 66 per cent) we
conclude that protective sentences would only very exceptionally be
justified, the justification laying in the anticipated depth of the of-
fender's violation of the rights of others (discounted by the degree of
uncertainty) outweighing the depth of the known violation of the of-
fender's right.
Id.
216. Cf. von Hirsch & Wasik, supra note 156, at 606, 624 (arguing that the
denial of voting rights is not justifiable on risk-prevention grounds).
217. 521 U.S. 346, 369 (1997).
218. See id. at 364.
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based on an individualized rather than a categorical assess-
ment of risk. Regular and frequent reviewability of risk-based
sanctions is also required. The termination of such sanctions
acknowledges that the offender no longer poses a safety risk to
the foundation of the state.
B. DEVELOPING GUIDELINE JUDGMENTS
Were the denial of voting rights to remain a potential sanc-
tion, even if only for a few crimes, the remaining question
would be under what circumstances and for how long a court is
to impose disenfranchisement. 2 19 Three distinct approaches are
possible. First, state legislatures can develop disenfranchise-
ment statutes along the lines proposed above, which leave
courts substantial discretion with respect to the application of
the sanction and the terms imposed. This approach is similar
to discretionary sentencing, which was the sole sentencing
model in the United States until the onset of sentencing guide-
lines. However, unbounded judicial discretion can lead to dis-
parity. As has been the experience in discretionary sentencing
jurisdictions, similarly situated offenders often do not receive
similar sentences. Disparity will remain manageable only if
disenfranchisement provisions are narrowly drafted. Other-
wise, sentencing guidelines may be advisable.
Sentencing commissions may draft guidelines in a variety
of manners. They can provide a narrow grid, reminiscent of the
federal sentencing guidelines, where elements of the offense
committed and the offender's criminal record largely determine
the sentence. Some existing state guideline models allow for
broader discretion by creating wider sentencing bands, with the
specific sentence selected based on hierarchically arranged sen-
tencing goals. However, the number of cases in which disen-
franchisement will be theoretically possible should be relatively
small if the list is compiled on penological rather than political
grounds. Therefore, a set of numerical guidelines is hardly
imaginable and will prove unnecessary. Moreover, a sentenc-
219. Enumerating the offenses that trigger disenfranchisement will pre-
vent the result of Otsuka v. Hite, 414 P.2d 412 (Cal. 1966). In the aftermath of
that decision, administrative units decided which offenses constituted "crimes
involving moral corruption and dishonesty, thereby branding their perpetrator
as a threat to the integrity of the elective process." Id. at 414. As a conse-
quence, disparity was rampant, and the situation was not remedied until Cali-
fornia abolished the denial of voting rights to ex-offenders. See Ramirez v.
Brown, 528 P.2d 378, 379 (1974); Tims, supra note 190, at 131-32.
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ing commission would be hard pressed to develop universally
valid guidelines, since it would have to operate without guid-
ance from prior cases and would have to make primarily pre-
scriptive decisions.220 Such normative judgments may be diffi-
cult to justify when made by an unelected commission rather
than the legislature or the judiciary.
The creation of guidelines for cases in which disenfran-
chisement is optional might be an appropriate exercise for the
federal and state appellate courts. These courts could develop
a common law in that area of sanctioning. Those decisions
could be modeled after the English guideline judgments. The
English Court of Appeal delivers these in individual cases at-
tempting to provide in narrative form sentencing guidance for
the lower courts.221 In making such guideline decisions, the
appellate courts should bear in mind the meaning of the fran-
chise in a democracy.222
Among the rights of citizenship, the right to vote is one of
the most integral.223 One court has even portrayed the lives of
those disenfranchised as "a shadowy form of citizenship."224
The South African Supreme Court characterized the franchise
as "a badge of dignity and personhood," which is of particular
importance because "[i]n a country of great disparities of
wealth and power it declares that whoever we are, whether rich
or poor, exalted or disgraced, we all belong to the same demo-
220. In drafting the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, the Sentencing Commis-
sion drew largely on a sample of cases decided previously but also made some
normative decisions. For a demand to see the Commission's database, see
Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Your Cheatin' Heart(land): The Long
Search for Administrative Sentencing Justice, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 723, 813
(1999).
221. For a description of the approach of the English Court of Appeal, see
Andrew Ashworth, Four Techniques for Reducing Sentence Disparity, in
PRINCIPLED SENTENCING, supra note 158, at 227, 227-29; D.A. Thomas, The
Role of the Court of Appeal in the English Sentencing System, 10 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 259, 261-62 (1998).
222. In April of 1999, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights
adopted a resolution "acknowledging that democracy is a universal and fun-
damental human right." Harold Hongju Koh, Address at Inaugural Confer-
ence of the Democracy Forum for East Asia (July 13, 1999) (transcript on file
with author).
223. See, e.g., von Hirsch & Wasik, supra note 156, at 606 (asserting that
voting is an important civil right of which even prison inmates should not be
deprived, especially in light of the racially discriminatory impact of disenfran-
chisement).
224. McLaughlin v. City of Canton, 947 F. Supp. 954, 971 (S.D. Miss.
1995).
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cratic South African nation; that our destinies are intertwined
in a single interactive polity. 2 25 Should those words not also
apply to the United States?
226
Guideline judgments might be able to set judicial guide-
posts for the imposition of such an (as envisioned) exceptional
sanction. 227 Their development would also provide appellate
courts with the experience and confidence to develop a greater
"common law of sentencing" to supplement the work of sen-
tencing commissions or to give guidance to lower courts. Such
judicial creation of sentencing rules would decrease disparity in
sentencing and help preserve the independence of the judiciary
from excessive legislative mandates.228
Although a legislatively imposed imprisonment threshold
would be desirable, it is unnecessary as long as the appellate
courts develop judgments that guide lower courts when such
sanctions are appropriate. The legislature could facilitate the
work of the judiciary in providing guidance and preventing un-
anticipated repercussions if it based its disenfranchisement
legislation on clearly articulated and ordered sentencing prin-
ciples.229 Alternatively, that task will fall solely upon the
courts.
The potential tendency in the United States to impose
lengthy bans on voting rights might be counteracted by the on-
going imposition of long prison terms which render such addi-
tional punishment hardly necessary. The frequent use of long-
term or even permanent bans would further contribute to the
internal exiling of offenders and deny them any chance of reha-
bilitation and reintegration. Appellate courts should, therefore,
225. August v. Electoral Comm'n, 1999 (8) SALR 14 (CC).
226. The judiciary and the legislature have recognized the importance of
voting rights. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 73, at 549-50. The latter has broad-
ened the franchise from property-owning white men over 21 years of age to
men and women of all races who are over 18 years, independent of their eco-
nomic status. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, XVII, XIX, XXIV, XXVI. The for-
mer has safeguarded voting rights and the equality of the votes cast by pre-
venting gerrymandering and race-based exclusions. See generally Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
227. For drawbacks of guideline judgments in regulating the entire field of
sentencing, see Ashworth, supra note 221, at 228-29.
228. See id. at 228.
229. See von Hirsch & Wasik, supra note 156, at 624 (criticizing the largely
unfettered power of courts to impose civil disqualifications and recommending
that legislation more narrowly circumscribing such judicial discretion be en-
acted).
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consider the impact of additional sanctions on the offender and
on society.
These guideline judgments may provide the needed impe-
tus for the creation of more guidance for German judges when
they are presented with the option of imposing a franchise re-
striction. Such a development would respond to one of the
criticisms of the German disenfranchisement provision 230 and
bring the comparative project full circle. Circumscribed judicial
discretion and limited, humane voting restrictions would be its
beneficial results.
V. A CONCLUDING CHALLENGE
The use of a comparative model indicates that denial of
voting rights in American law is a historical throwback devoid
of justification or rationale. Because disenfranchisement is nei-
ther constitutionally mandated nor legally (or logically) expli-
cable, it should at least be restricted in line with the German
provision. While the ultimate abolition of voting restrictions
for ex-offenders might be most desirable, the more differenti-
ated German model which grants the judge discretion, in very
limited situations, to impose a voting ban might be an approach
state legislatures can realistically consider adopting. In the
United States, a limitation on the denial of the franchise also
would significantly remedy the current racial imbalance
prevalent throughout the fourteen states whose voting bans are
automatic and permanent.
While the United States tends to be quick in charging
other countries with human rights violations and exhorting
them to adhere to "modern standards," the exclusion of ex-
offenders from the franchise with its direct and symbolic conse-
quences indicates that "all is not well at home."231 If changes
similar to those suggested in this Article are not implemented,
denial of voting rights to ex-offenders will likely be added to the
death penalty as another, albeit less widely publicized, area in
which the United States subjects itself to the scorn of the in-
ternational human rights community.
230. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
231. In its 1998 Report, Human Rights Watch and the Sentencing Project
urged the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the United Nations
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination to examine felony dis-
enfranchisement in the United States. See FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 4,
at 23.
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